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SAFE: RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS




This Article examines the emerging phenomenon and implications of sex
offender covenants, the latest wave of sex offender legislation, under com-
mon law property rules such as touch and concern and the doctrine prohib-
iting restraints against alienation. The paper theorizes that courts use
common law property rules to strike down personal "who" covenants,
such as those based on race, age, disability, and often permanently
debilitating sex offender status, that run afoul of public policy norms-
most particularly, the wide availability of safe and decent housing for all.
The Article analogizes blanket sex offender covenants to their racially
restrictive progenitors, arguing that both types of covenants are based on
unsubstantiated fears that one population would sexually terrorize another.
The modern-day fear is that convicted sex offenders will sexually prey
upon children, whereas the underlying fear in the era of racial segregation
was that black men, this country's original sexual predators, would sexually
prey upon infantilized white women. Finally, this Article looks to the sor-
did history of racial segregation for lessons and solutions to the modern-
day problem of convicted sex offenders.
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INTRODUCTION
N an elusive quest for security,' most people do not want convicted
sex offenders for neighbors. 2 Consequently, developers, sensing resi-
dential real estate gold and homeowners and condominium associa-
tions concerned with residents' welfare, are increasingly employing the
favored tool of neighborhood private legislation, the restrictive cove-
nant,3 to achieve this end in many common interest communities (CICs). 4
Indeed, certain subdivisions are being marketed as "sex offender free
communities" and are wildly popular as a result. 5
1. A. Dan Tarlock, Touch and Concern is Dead, Long Live the Doctrine, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 804, 808 (1998) ("The practice of sorting people by homogeneous architecture and
behavior rules," as is the norm in many common interest communities, "create[s] islands of
security and tranquility in the midst of a rapidly changing society.").
2. This sentence stems from the first line of a law review article stating that "[miost
white people do not want Negroes for neighbors." Arthur T. Martin, Segregation of Resi-
dences of Negroes, 32 MICH. L. REV. 721, 721 (1934). The National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children reports that there are 686,515 registered sex offenders in the United
States (223 per 100,000 people). SPECIAL ANALYSIS UNIT, NAT'L CTR. FOR MISSING &
EXPLOITED CHILDREN, REGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES PER 100,000
POPULATION 1 (2009), available at http://www.missingkids.comlenUS/documents/sex-of-
fender-map.pdf; see also Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 16911(1) (2006) ("The term 'sex offender' means an individual convicted of a sex of-
fense."). The label applies equally to the teen who has sex with his underage girlfriend, the
permissive mother whose teen daughter is impregnated, the flasher, the pedophile, and the
rapist of adult women. See infra notes 20, 27, and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, Easements Charges
and Liens on and for Milwaukee Ridge, City of Lubbock, Texas, § 9.22 (Feb. 6, 2008) ("No
registered sex offender (as defined in Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure) shall own or reside on any part of any Lot in the Addition .... The failure to comply
with this restriction may, at the Association's option, subject the Owner to a fine of
$1000.00 per day for each day that such Owner fails to comply with this restriction.");
Declaration re: Iris Park Subdivision and Iris Park Homeowners Association, Inc. § 22
(Dec. 11, 2006) (stating that "[i]n the event that the background check reveals the exis-
tence of a criminal history, defined by the information received, as sufficient to identify the
person as a 'sex offender,' or having committed a 'sex offense,' whether or not that person
is in compliance with local, state, or federal sex offender registration laws, the contract
shall be rejected by the Association and shall not be accepted by the owner/seller of the
property" and subjecting any resident who sells to a sex offender or attains the subsequent
status of sex offender to a fine of $1000 per day); Declaration of Covenants and Restric-
tions, Panther Valley, Allamuchy Township, Warren County, New Jersey Amended and
Restated art. XII, § l(a) (Dec. 16, 1998), available at http://pvpca.org/pvpca.asp?Category
Name=Article%20XII [hereinafter Panther Valley Declaration] (stating that no individual
required to register his or her residence as a Tier III sex offender under New Jersey law
"may permanently or temporarily reside in a Lot as an Owner, tenant, or under any other
possessory interest"). Panther Valley's sex offender covenant was challenged in Mulligan
v. Panther Valley Property Owners Ass'n, in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey up-
held the homeowners association's amended covenant banning Tier III sex offenders, those
deemed at highest risk of re-offending. 766 A.2d 1186, 1189-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
4. ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 41 (1989)
(stating that covenanted subdivisions create an extensive system of servitudes that may
include rights of property access and use along with the imposition of obligations and/or
charges relating to maintenance and repair and may also provide for the creation of a
Property Owners Association).
5. Betsy Blaney, Texas Developers Plan Sex Offender-Free Neighborhood in Lub-
bock, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 6, 2005, available at http://www.lubbockonline.com/stories/
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Stories are legion about the extensive powers of many homeowners
and condominium associations, known broadly as community associa-
tions, which regulate everything from house color 6 to backyard vegetable
gardens7 to kissing in the driveway8 in a quest for uniformity and a
unique sense of community that some commentators have derided as in-
herently exclusionary.9 This Article squarely confronts the issue of
whether a community association's power extends to regulating the sex
offender as neighbor and, specifically, as owner or occupier, under com-
mon law property rules.
The weapon of choice in this private battle pitting neighbor against sex
offender is the restrictive covenant, an implement well-tested in the
neighborhood battles of yore-skirmishes that often placed African-
American, Asian-American, Jewish, and Mexican-American newcomers
in opposition to incumbent white residents. 10 The implement came into
vogue after the Supreme Court, in Buchanan v. Warley, struck down nu-
060605/LOC_060605029.shtml ("The sales pitch for a planned subdivision [in Lubbock,
Texas,] promises safety: criminal background checks for homeowners and, guaranteed, no
convicted sex offenders."); Internet Broadcasting Systems, Inc., New Subdivisions Ban Sex
Offenders from Moving In, June 13, 2006, available at http://www.theindychannel.com/fam-
ily/9362047/detail.html (reporting that an additional sex offender free subdivision was be-
ing planned outside of Kansas City, Missouri, and that the developer's similar development
in Lubbock, Texas, "has nearly sold out in nine months"); see also KWTX, Amarillo Subdi-
vision Looks to Ban Sex Offenders, Nov. 23, 2007, http://www.kwtx.com/home/headlines/
l1756576.html; Texas: Sex Offenders Barred From Subdivision, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2007,
at All, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/1l/24/us/24brfs-SEXOFFENDERS-
BRF.html (noting that the same developer had "barred convicted sex offenders from own-
ing or living in any new home" in the same Amarillo development).6. Timothy Egan, The Serene Fortress: A Special Report.; Many Seek Security in Pri-
vate Communities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, at 1, available at http://nytimes.com/1995/09/
3/us/the-serene-fortress-a-special-report-many-seek-secuirty-in-private-communities.htmI
(stating that several committees in Bear Creek, a high-end private community outside of
Seattle, Washington, regulate "everything from house colors ... to whether basketball
hoops can be attached to the garage").
7. EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 13 (1994) (stating that one of the largest common
interest developments at the time, the private community of Rancho Bernardo, which is
located outside of San Diego, California, regulates "[e]ven vegetable gardens" (quoting
RICHARD Louv, AMERICA II 80 (1983))).
8. Id. at 17-18 (quoting Editorial, Kissing and Doing Bad Things: Grandmother Feels
Lash of Intrusive Condominium Association, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1991, at B6).
9. See, e.g., David L. Callies et al., Ramapo Looking Forward: Gated Communities,
Covenants, and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 183 (2003) ("All three categories of gated
communities reflect several principal social values: (1) a sense of community, (2) exclu-
sion, and (3) privatization.").
10. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 5 (1948) (striking down a restrictive covenant,
which provided that for fifty years no part of the property should be occupied by people of
the "Negro or Mongolian Race," because enforcement of the covenant in state court would
constitute a state action); Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181, 183 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892) (de-
claring a covenant not to convey or lease land to a "Chinaman" void and contrary to public
policy); Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272, 273-74 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1949, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (refusing to enforce a restrictive covenant that prohibited the sale or lease of
property to persons of Mexican descent); In re Wren, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 674, 674 (Can.)
(declaring a covenant that prohibited the sale of land to Jews or persons of objectionable
nationality void and contrary to public policy). In addition, racial and ethnic residential
segregation was not unique to the United States. For instance, during the Middle Ages,
Jews were publicly restricted in many parts of Europe to "ghettoes," and Ireland histori-
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merous public efforts to zone racial groups into certain areas of the city," 1
a response to the waves of southern blacks flooding northern and western
cities in the Great Migration in search of greater economic opportunity. 12
The racially restrictive covenant, which was promulgated by independent
neighborhood associations, proved to be the next frontier in white urban
America's efforts to secure racial homogeneity and to repel a residential
"negro invasion."'1 3 In a similar vein, this Article theorizes that the next
wave of sex offender legislation may well occur in the private clubhouses
and living rooms of America's master-planned, gated, and condominium
communities in lieu of the very public forum of the legislature. The pub-
lic policy implications of this privately helmed next wave may be severe.
Americans are increasingly calling CICs their home. For example, in
1970, only 2.1 million individuals resided in these communities, whereas
59.5 million people in 300,800 communities called these neighborhoods
home in 2005.14 Moreover, these communities, once arguably the sole
cally banned native Celts from living outside certain areas or beyond the "Irish pale." T.
B. Benson, Segregation Ordinances, 1 VA. L. REG. 330, 330 (1916).
11. 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (holding that an "attempt to prevent the alienation of the
property ... to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
state" and was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prevents "state interference
with property rights except by due process of law"); see also Carol Rose, Property Stories:
Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 189, 193-94 (Gerald Kornguld & Andrew P.
Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009) (noting that several other cities enacted public zoning of racial
groups, including Baltimore, Maryland, which, in 1910, was the first major city to enact a
racial zoning ordinance); Warren B. Hunting, The Constitutionality of Race Distinctions
and the Baltimore Negro Segregation Ordinance, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 24, 24 (1911) (discuss-
ing the criminalization of "any white person to take up his residence in a negro block, or a
negro in a white block").
12. See Leland B. Ware, Invisible Walls: An Examination of the Legal Strategy of the
Restrictive Covenant Cases, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 737, 739 (1989) ("Racially restrictive cove-
nants were prompted, in large measure, by the great migration of black families from rural
areas to northern and midwestern industrial centers. The migration from field to factory
began in the second decade of the twentieth century and reached its peak during the Sec-
ond World War.").
13. Andrew A. Bruce, Racial Zoning by Private Contract in the Light of the Constitu-
tions and the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation, 21 ILL. L. REV. 704, 716 (1927); see also
Ware, supra note 12, at 738 ("The great migration of black families from rural areas to
urban industrial centers prompted various efforts to establish and maintain racial segrega-
tion in housing. After legislated segregation failed, private covenants became the primary
vehicle for maintaining segregated housing."). The Supreme Court upheld racially restric-
tive covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley, reasoning that federal constitutional restraints such
as the Fifth and Thirteenth Amendments, which would otherwise apply to public zoning,
were inapplicable to prohibit "private individuals from entering into contracts respecting
the control and disposition of their own property." 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926). Under the
state action principle defined by the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 23, racially
restrictive covenants were subsequently struck down, more than twenty years later.
14. Community Associations Institute, Community Association Data 1970-2008, http:/
/www.caionline.org/info/researchlPagesldefault.aspx (last visited Aug. 29, 2009). Indeed,
almost twenty percent of all U.S. residential real estate, totaling approximately four trillion
dollars, is governed by community associations. Id. Frank Ratham, Vice President of
Communications and Public Relations for the Community Associations Institute, indicates
that the vast majority of community homes built in the last fifteen to twenty years are
governed by a community association. Telephone Interview by Joely Stewart with Frank




province of the wealthy, have crossed economic strata into the middle-
class, and for many families they are the only affordable housing choice.' 5
To be sure, this next wave of private sex offender legislation may likely
be the coda to all or most sex offender legislation, given that little else
can be done to rid society of the "scourge" posed by this population. 16
Indeed, this next wave may follow in the wake of increasingly severe sex
offender restraints that began with registration requirements, progressed
to community notification mandates, and currently are manifest in public
residency restrictions banning the convicted sex offender from living any-
where between 500 and 2,500 feet of a school, child care center, park, or
other child-friendly sites.17
Public residency restrictions have been criticized as being dangerously
overinclusive by incentivizing the behavior against which they were de-
signed to guard.a8 These restrictions relegate convicted sex offenders to
society's physical and psychological margins in the cornfields of Iowa, the
underpasses of Miami, the industrial areas of cities, the woods of Geor-
gia, or the bed of a dried-up river in California 19 without regard to future
15. See Callies et al., supra note 9, at 180 ("Once considered the domain only of the
most affluent, today[,] CICs represent the main staple of suburban and metropolitan resi-
dential development. In particular, the demand for gated and walled communities has
risen both in suburban and urban areas across diverse economic strata."); see also McKEN-
ZIE, supra note 7, at 11-12 (noting that common interest developments have "become the
norm for new housing" in many areas of the country, which restricts consumer choice);
Egan, supra note 6 ("What is different now is that a big portion of middle-class families, in
nonretirement, largely white areas of the country, have chosen to wall themselves off, opt-
ing for private government, schools and police."). In addition, according to the latest stud-
ies, much of the CIC development is concentrated, first, in the Sunbelt states of California,
Florida, and Texas; and second, in New Jersey, New York, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Mary-
land, and Hawaii. Id. at 11 (citing a 1989 national survey by the Advisory Committee on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR)); see also Telephone Interview by Joely Stewart with
Frank Ratham, supra note 14 (stating that, although he has not collected data regarding
income, he believes that members of community associations have a wide range of incomes
because most homes built in the last fifteen to twenty years are governed by community
associations).
16. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1887 (2006) (underscoring the extent to which convicted sex of-
fenders are "universally loathed" and the notion that they represent modern-day
America's "least desirable neighbors of all," who are singled out for "harsher post-release
restrictions than [even] murderers").
17. See Asmara Tekle-Johnson, In the Zone: Sex Offenders and the Ten-Percent Solu-
tions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 607, 610 nn.5-7, 613 n.19 (2009) (describing the evolution of con-
victed sex offender legislation); Karl Vick, Laws to Track Sex Offenders Encouraging
Homelessness, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2008, at A03 (noting that California's Proposition 83,
passed in November 2006, prevents convicted sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of
a school or park).
18. See infra note 20.
19. Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 621-22 nn.52-57; see also Damien Cave, Roadside
Camp for Miami Sex Offenders Leads to Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 10, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/us/lOoffender.html (describing Julia Tuttle Bridge in
Miami-Dade County as a place where "[a]t least 70 convicted sex offenders live ... now, in
a shantytown on Biscayne Bay with trash piles clawed by crabs. It has become what even
law enforcement officials call a public-safety hazard, produced by laws intended to keep
the public safe."); see also Homeless Ga. Sex Offenders Directed to Woods, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/09/28/us/AP-US-Sex-Offender-
Camp.html ("A small group of homeless sex offenders have been ordered to move from a
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levels of dangerousness, the original offense, or the displacement of sup-
port and employment mechanisms, such as jobs, transportation, family,
and care that could prevent recidivism.20
Much of this extreme punishment directed towards the convicted sex
offender is predicated on the erroneous belief that this offender, unlike
all others, is destined to reoffend against children.21 In fact, ninety-three
percent of sex crimes against children are committed by family members
or acquaintances of the child.22 In addition, empirical evidence suggests
that, comparatively, sex offenders are among the least likely to recidivate
in the criminal offender population.23 Sadly, the exclusive focus on the
makeshift camp in a densely wooded area behind a suburban office park. The sex offend-
ers had been directed to the camp by probation officers ... [who] said it was a location of
last resort for the sex offenders who are barred from living in many areas by one of the
nation's toughest sex offender policies. .. . [Cobb County Sheriff Neil] Warren said he did
not know where the sex offenders would go next."); Vick, supra note 17 (stating that,
because of California's sex offender residency regime, a convicted rapist on post-conviction
release "ended up in a tent on the dry bed of the Ventura River").
20. Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 613 nn.15-18; see also Vick, supra note 17 (noting
that groups ranging from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, the
California Coalition on Sex Offending, the Iowa County Attorneys Association, and the
California Sex Offender Management Board have decried sex offender residency regimes
as "well-intentioned failure[s]," ineffective, and constituting unsound public policy). The
article goes on to quote Detective Diane Webb, a Los Angeles Police Department supervi-
sor of the unit tracking the 5,000 sex offenders in Los Angeles County, as stating that
"[t]he public was definitely sold a bill of goods on this one." Id. Similarly, public residency
restrictions on sex offenders have been critiqued as violations of the federal Ex Post Facto
Clause, largely because few regimes distinguish between types of sex offenders, lumping
the serial pedophile with the flasher, the permissive mom, or the mature adolescent. Tekle-
Johnson, supra note 17, at 616-17, & n.20.
21. Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 611 & n.12.
22. See HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG
CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER
CHARACTERISTICS 10 tbl.6 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sayc-
rle.pdf (culling the Uniform Crime Reporting Program's National Incident-Based Report-
ing System's master files for the years 1991 through 1996); see also Vick, supra note 17
(citing Justice Department statistics, which "show that ninety-three percent of child victims
are molested by someone they know" and quoting Professor Jill Levenson, an expert on
sex offenders, as saying that "[tihere's this mythology that you have to know who this scary
man is in the neighborhood that might hurt your child, when the reality is that sex offend-
ers are often people we know and love").
23. See Lisa Sandberg, Unlikely Force Fighting Sex Crime's Stigma: Texas Voices
Wants Laws to Note Difference Between Dangerous Predators, Nonviolent Offenders,
HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 13, 2008, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metro-
politan/6163587.html. "According to a 2003 U.S. Justice Department study, roughly 5 per-
cent of sex offenders released from prison were rearrested for another sex crime within
three years, a recidivism rate lower than for many other types of crimes." Id. This study
tracked 9,691 men whose crime was a violent sex offense, including a sex offense against a
minor, and who were released from state prisons in fifteen states for three years (encom-
passing two-thirds of all male sex offenders released in 1994) and measured their recidi-
vism rates, determined by rates of rearrest, reconviction, and reimprisonment. PATRICK A.
LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM
PRISON IN 1994, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
In some instances, the study compared the 9,691 male sex offenders to the 272,111 total
prisoners released in 1994. Id. The male sex offenders constituted 3.6% of all releases.
Id. Of the released sex offenders, 5.3% were rearrested for a violent sex crime, although
the study's authors acknowledge a likely undercount of 1.0% and a figure closer to 6.6%.
Id. at 24, 38. This results in a 3.5% rate of reconviction for a violent sex crime. Id. at 2. In
2009] Safe 1823
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wide universe of individuals labeled as convicted sex offenders distracts
from the overwhelming majority of perpetrators of child sex abuse-fam-
ily and friends-perhaps because these individuals remain uncomfortably
close to home.
Despite their growing relevance and popularity as a result of increas-
ingly harsh public residency constraints on convicted sex offenders and
the heightened tension surrounding this population, private residency re-
gimes have largely remained unexplored in the academic literature.24
However, public safety demands effective public policy, especially in ju-
risdictions where public restrictions are already in place, and convicted
sex offenders are arguably foreclosed from even more housing opportuni-
ties. Similarly, public policy requires that the social costs of housing con-
victed sex offenders be shared and that no community, public or private,
be permitted to opt out. This Article further argues that the common law
has played an underappreciated role in checking overreaching private re-
strictions that cumulatively make for unwise public policy.
Accordingly, Part I lays the groundwork for this argument by discuss-
ing the common law property doctrines historically applicable to restric-
addition, while non-sex offenders had only a 1.3% rearrest rate for a violent sex crime,
"[r]eleased sex offenders accounted for 17% and released non-sex offenders accounted for
83% of the 1,251 sex crimes against children committed by all the prisoners released in
1994." Id. at 31. In addition, the study showed that 43% of the released sex offenders
were rearrested for a crime of any kind, as compared to 68% of non-sex offenders. Id. at
14. Of the rearrest charges for the sex offenders, 75% were felonies, as compared to 84%
for the non-sex offenders. Id. Finally, 24% of the sex offenders, as compared to 47.8% of
the non-sex offenders, were reconvicted for crime of any kind. Id.; see also Michelle L.
Meloy, The Sex Offender Next Door: An Analysis of Recidivism, Risk Factors, and Deter-
rence of Sex Offenders on Probation, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 211, 233 n.8 (2005); Carl
Bialik, Underreporting Clouds Attempt to Count Repeat Sex Offenders, WALL ST. J., Jan.
25, 2008, at B1 ("Among convicted criminals released from prison, sex offenders released
from prison are less likely to be arrested for any new crime than most other offenders.");
Vick, supra note 17 ("Clinicians say the odds of an individual re-offending can be predicted
with reasonable confidence by assessments that take into account age, offense, history and
other variables. In the entire population of sex offenders, clinicians say, about 15 percent
bear close watch."); CTR. FOR OFFENDER MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MYTHS AND
FACTS ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS 3 (2000), available at http://www.johnhoward.ca/trends/
mythsfacts.pdf ("It is noteworthy that recidivism rates for sex offenders are lower than for
the general criminal population."). Professor Meloy notes that:
Sex offender legislation does not target the most common and most high-risk
sex crime scenarios (i.e., date rape, adult female victims, and child molesta-
tion cases involving perpetrators who often know the victim intimately).
Rather, sex offender registration/community notification, for example, is de-
signed almost exclusively to protect children from stranger assailants, a statis-
tically rare occurrence.
Meloy, supra, at 233 n.8.
24. The issue has received cursory attention in a student-written comment that floated
the notion of whether sex offender covenants violate the common law property norms
prohibiting restraints on alienation, the reasonableness test, and public policy. John J. Her-
man, Comment, Not in My Community: Is It Legal for Private Entities to Ban Sex Offend-
ers from Living in Their Communities?, 16 WIDENER L.J. 165, 171-76 (2006). In addition,
one blog posed the question whether "Pedophile-Free Associations" were the "Wave of
the Future or Unconstitutional?" Posting of Elysa D. Bergenfeld to New Jersey Law Blog,
http://www.njlawblog.com/2006/07/articles/community-associations/pedophilefree-associa-
tions-the-wave-of-the-future-or-unconstitutional/ (July 6, 2006, 08:45 EST).
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tive covenants generally: (1) touch and concern, (2) the rule prohibiting
restraints on alienation, (3) the principle proscribing unreasonable cove-
nants generally, and (4) the precept precluding covenants that contravene
public policy.25 It introduces the concept of "who" covenants, covenants
based on personal and largely immutable characteristics and often an un-
substantiated fear resulting from these characteristics. 26 It also uses prior
"who" covenants, such as those based on race and ethnicity, age, disabil-
ity, pet-ownership, quasi-religious affiliation, and even Yankee origins, as
touchstones of analysis in the discussion of common law property doc-
trines to theorize that courts have used the common law to terminate
"who" covenants that run afoul of public policy. In no way, however,
does this Article equate convicted sex offenders with racial and ethnic
groups that have been the targets of racially restrictive covenants, such as
individuals of African, Latin, and Asian descent, or with disabled individ-
uals who have been affected by single-family use covenants; rather, the
Article equates the public policy effects of "who" covenants, as private
land-use devices, on these once or currently marginalized populations.
Part II then turns its attention squarely to sex offender covenants and
applies the common law property doctrines to them. It posits that these
latest iterations of "who" covenants are generally more akin in their pub-
lic policy effects to their racially restrictive and disability-based anteced-
ents. They foreclose housing opportunities and concentrate the social
costs of housing sex offenders to certain areas and populations that may
lack the powerful implement of the restrictive covenant. This part subse-
quently asserts that sex offender covenants should be struck down under
the common law unless they are narrowly tailored to focus on the most
dangerous convicted sex offenders, a determination based on original of-
fense or future risk of dangerousness. 27
25. Because this paper analyzes sex offender covenants under the common law prop-
erty doctrines, which are largely still in effect in many jurisdictions, the examination of
these covenants under the Restatement (Third) of Property is beyond the scope of this
paper. Though calling for the elimination of the formative common law property doctrines
of touch and concern and unreasonable restraints on alienation, the Restatement (Third)
recommends the termination of restrictive covenants that substantively violate public pol-
icy. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 1-6 (1998). This conclusion is in
keeping with this Article's thesis that courts use common law property rules to assess
whether "who" covenants conform to or violate public policy and to uphold or to strike
down these covenants based on an assessment derived from public policy.
26. The term "who" covenant derives from Carol Rose's work. See Rose, supra note
11, at 198 ("A constraint on who can buy land, as opposed to what uses they can make of it,
must have seemed peculiarly troublesome [with respect to applying the common law prop-
erty doctrine prohibiting restraints on alienation to racially restrictive covenants].").
27. See R. KARL HANSON & ANDREW HARRIS, DEP'T OF THE SOLICITOR GEN. CAN.,
DYNAMIC PREDICTORS OF SEXUAL RECIDIvISM 21, 25, 26 (1998), available at http://
www.static99.org/pdfdocs/hansonandharrisl998.pdf (examining the effect of dynamic risk
factors on the recidivism rates of almost 400 sex offenders in Canada, who were evenly
divided between rapists, child molesters of boys, and child molesters of girls); see Robert F.
Worth, Exiling Sex Offenders from Town; Questions About Legality and Effectiveness, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at B1 (reporting that "pedophiles ... have recidivism rates of more
than 50 percent"); Panther Valley Declaration, supra note 3.
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Part III places sex offender covenants in historical context by arguing
that, like their racially restrictive progenitors, they are based on unsub-
stantiated fears contravened by empirical evidence that all convicted sex
offenders will sexually prey upon children. In the era of the racially re-
strictive covenant, the underlying and unsubstantiated fear was that black
men, this country's original sexual predators, would sexually terrorize in-
fantilized white women. It then concludes by reflecting on the lessons
and solutions to the sex offender problem offered by the sordid history of
racial segregation.
I. LAYING THE FOUNDATION: COMMON LAW PROPERTY
RULES AND PRIOR "WHO" COVENANTS
Sex offender covenants follow a long line of prior "who" covenants,
those grounded in personal and largely immutable characteristics and
often unsubstantiated fear. The paradigmatic "who" covenant is the ra-
cially restrictive covenant. In more recent years the classification has ex-
panded to include age, disability, pet, quasi-religious, and even Yankee
covenants. Individual common law property doctrines have been used to
uphold or to invalidate each type of covenant. However, this Article as-
serts that the overarching principle guiding the common law's examina-
tion of "who" covenants is whether they conform to current norms of
public policy.
A. TOUCH AND CONCERN
In order for restrictive covenants "to run with the land," or to pass to
successive owners, the common law has historically required that cove-
nants touch and concern the land.28 The doctrine's purpose was to ensure
that maximum utility was gleaned from real property29 and to prevent the
attachment of unduly personal promises to land that would inhibit its use
by successive owners.30 The touch and concern analysis has traditionally
been a minefield, distinguished by a vague set of principles that undergird
28. Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177, 182-83 (N.C. 1992).
It is well established that an owner of land in fee has a right to sell his land
subject to any restrictions he may see fit to impose .... Such restrictions are
often included as covenants in the deed conveying the property and may be
classified as either personal covenants or real covenants that are said to run
with the land .... A restrictive covenant is a real covenant that runs with the
land ... only if (1) the subject of the covenant touches and concerns the land
Id. (emphasis added).
29. Uriel Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 150
(1978).
30. Michael J.D. Sweeney, Note, The Changing Role of Private Land Restrictions: Re-
forming Servitude Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 673 (1995) (stating that the purpose of
the touch and concern requirement is to "prevent the attachment of personal obligations to
land that may defeat efficient allocation and to control unreasonable affirmative burdens
and externalities that arise from servitudes").
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it.31 However, unanimity has been achieved by dividing the touch and
concern analysis into (1) the benefit posed by the restrictive covenant;
and (2) the burden that the covenant poses. 32
On the benefit side, a restrictive covenant runs with the land when it
increases the value or enjoyment of the beneficiary's land.33 Similarly,
the burden of a restrictive covenant touches and concerns the land when
it "bear[s] some relationship (exactly what kind of relationship is not al-
ways clear) to the use and enjoyment of property. ' 34 In covenanted sub-
divisions, including many CICs with residential community associations,
the burdens and benefits of mutual covenants attach to the ownership of
each parcel of land.35
1. Property Value
Evocative of the arguments used to uphold sex offender covenants
were those used to support pre-Shelley racially restrictive covenants as
value-maximizing devices that maintained, if not increased, property val-
ues.3 6 These covenants were bold attempts to maintain the urban "for-
tresses of whiteness" against the encroaching "black belts," or enclaves of
black Americans who had migrated to points north and west as part of
the Great Migration.37 A common argument was that many white indi-
viduals could not countenance residing in a neighborhood with a critical
mass of black individuals, resulting in the decline of property values rela-
tive to white buyers, a situation that arguably still exists even today.
3 8
31. See Tarlock, supra note 1, at 811 ("There is a widespread consensus among com-
mentators that the rule is vague and, therefore, impossible to reduce to a single, uniform
test."); see also Runyon, 416 S.E.2d at 183 ("As noted by several courts and commentators,
the touch and concern requirement is not capable of being reduced to an absolute test or
precise definition.").
32. See Runyon, 416 S.E.2d at 183 (describing the touch and concern requirement as
requiring the judiciary to concentrate "on the nature of the burdens and benefits created
by a covenant," to determine if the covenant runs with the land (citing CHARLES E.
CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 96 (2d ed.
1947))).
33. Id.
34. NATELSON, supra note 4, at 52.
35. Id. at 50.
36. Ware, supra note 12, at 771 ("The redistribution of the black population from rural
to urban areas, and the availability of jobs in a growing industrial economy, assured that
the rapid growth of black populations in cities could not be contained physically within the
tiny districts to which they were confined by the covenants."); see also Rose, supra note 11,
at 208-09 (identifying three responses to the encroachment of blacks into "new locations"
as a result of the severe overcrowding or black urban ghettoes: (1) violence; (2) white
flight; and (3) racially restrictive covenants).
37. Bruce, supra note 13, at 716 (referring to white areas that "might become entirely
surrounded by a black belt"); see supra note 36.
38. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA.
L. REV. 437, 446 (2006) ("Caucasians who purchase homes in a new development that
ultimately tips toward African American composition will incur substantial economic costs
as a result. Real estate has historically appreciated much more quickly in all-white neigh-
borhoods than in neighborhoods that have a ten percent African American population,
and noticeably more quickly in ten percent African American neighborhoods than in
twenty percent African American neighborhoods."); see Rose, supra note 11, at 204 ("Real
2009] Safe 1827
SMU LAW REVIEW
Viewed from this perspective, therefore, these covenants ran with the
land on the benefit side because they protected real property values rela-
tive to white buyers.
On the other hand, while white individuals may have been less inclined
to reside in a neighborhood that left them bereft of the property-value
protection afforded by the racially restrictive covenant, black individuals'
demand for these same neighborhoods was astronomical and commanded
extremely high prices. 39 A large pool of black buyers was desperate to
escape the overcrowded conditions of the ghetto.40 Therefore, relative to
black buyers, racially restrictive covenants arguably decreased land val-
ues, in contravention of the free market and the demands of the benefit
side of the touch and concern equation.
2. Enjoyment
Reminiscent of arguments supporting sex offender covenants, 4 1 private
and public racially restrictive zoning pre-Shelley and pre-Buchanan were
largely premised on the notion that they would promote racial peace and
social harmony, thereby increasing beneficiaries' enjoyment.4 2 More
pointedly, and in keeping with the era, racially restrictive zoning may
have alleviated white individuals' discomfort with sharing some of their
most private spaces, their neighborhoods, with people of color. Viewed
from this perspective, therefore, racially restrictive covenants satisfied the
benefit side of the touch and concern analysis by increasing the enjoy-
ment of white beneficiaries.
In the 1980s, a similar line of reasoning was used to support the public
zoning of group homes for the mentally challenged in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center.43 Indeed, the City of Cleburne argued that the
zoning ordinance should be upheld because it mitigated harassment to-
wards this vulnerable population, another version of the pre-Buchanan
estate professionals found evidence that the presence of African Americans of [sic] other
nonwhite minorities diminished the property values for whites.
39. Ware, supra note 12, at 742.
40. Id. ("Because the demand for housing in black communities was far greater than
the available supply, white homesellers frequently obtained substantially higher prices
from black purchasers than they would have received from white buyers. As a result, de-
spite the elaborate mechanisms that were created to perpetuate segregated communities,
white homeowners and real estate agents had a significant economic incentive to sell
properties to black purchasers."); see also Bruce, supra note 13, at 704.
41. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
42. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 70, 82 (striking down a municipal ordinance de-
signed "to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white and colored races in the city of
Louisville, and to preserve the public peace and promote the general welfare, by ... re-
quiring... the use of separate blocks, for residences, places of abode, and places of assem-
bly by white and colored people respectively," and declaring the ordinance an illegitimate
exercise of the state's police power in violation of the U.S. Constitution).
43. 473 U.S. 432, 433, 448 (1985) (holding a city ordinance that required a special use
permit for a proposed group home invalid under the rational basis test of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause because the record contained no "rational basis for believing that the proposed
group home would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate interests").
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social harmony argument. 44 While Cleburne concerned restrictions in
public zoning, the takeaway in the private zoning context is significant
because it explicitly repudiated the argument that an unfounded fear of
the mentally challenged was sufficient to restrict this population from re-
siding in certain areas. 45 Similarly, Shelley arguably implicitly rejected
whites' similarly unfounded fear of living in close proximity to people of
color.46 In other words, though there may be some marginal benefit to
certain populations with respect to land values and "enjoyment," race-
and disability-based "who" restrictions that are grounded in unsubstanti-
ated fear serve no real benefit to the use and enjoyment of land under
touch and concern analysis.4
7
B. RESTRAINT AGAINST ALIENATION
1. Background
In addition to the touch and concern requirement, the common law of
property also prohibits restraints against alienation, or constraints on
transferring ownership interests in real property. 48 The reasons for this
doctrine are several. First, the smaller the pool of potential purchasers,
the lower a property's resale value is likely to be.49 Paradoxically, by re-
straining the number of buyers, restrictions may also "concentrate
wealth" by keeping "property out of commerce. ' 50 Restrictions on alien-
ation may also prevent the ability of creditors to satisfy claims.
5 1
In addition, a restricted pool of buyers decreases the incentive for ex-
44. Id. at 449.
45. See id. at 450 (commenting that the special use requirement was based on "irra-
tional prejudice" towards the mentally challenged); id. at 448 (noting that "mere negative
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning
proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differ-
ently from" other group dwellings).
46. The Court achieved this aim by relying on the dubious "state action" doctrine to
strike down the restrictions. See William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Re-
thinking 'Rethinking State Action', 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 558 (1985) ("The state action doc-
trine has been soundly criticized for being hopelessly confused and inconsistent.
Commentators argue that the public/private distinction of the state action doctrine has
been wrongly and perhaps disingenuously applied by the Supreme Court in order to avoid
the substantive constitutional inquiry."). But see Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past,
Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 86 (2002) ("Although the state action
doctrine has a dubious constitutional pedigree, the Court has reaffirmed it so often and
recently that its continuing authority cannot really be doubted.").
47. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text; see also Sweeney, supra note 30, at
672 (discussing extremely personal promises). The burden analysis of the touch and con-
cern doctrine is similar to that regarding benefit. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying
text. As on the benefit side, because racially restrictive covenants are grounded in per-
sonal and immutable characteristics, they bear little relationship to the use and enjoyment
of land because their benefit derives not from a use of land, but from who lives on it and
because they are unduly personal. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
48. Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 175 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1919).
49. Rose, supra note 11, at 198.




isting owners to improve or maintain real property,52 given that the land
may be more difficult to sell. This underinvestment causes a snowball ef-
fect to occur on existing properties in the area, resulting in broader
"neighborhood deterioration" and "genuine social impact. ' 53
On the other hand, certain restrictions that "are valuable to a substan-
tial class of bidders," such as noise and residential-only use restraints,
may "offset" this underinvestment by increasing opportunities for re-
sale.54 However, as Professor Rose points out, although these kinds of
restraints may be intrinsically valuable, courts were particularly vexed
during the era of racially restrictive covenants by the issue of whether to
uphold "who" covenants in comparison to their "use" counterparts. 55
Historically, the common law preferred the certainty of forbidding any
restraint on alienation, even though it may have been limited in duration,
class of persons affected, or present or future property interest. 56 This
bright-line rule was used to address the difficulty in ascertaining the "di-
viding line" between an unreasonable and void restraint and one that
may be upheld.57 Therefore, under this bright-line rule, many sex of-
fender covenants would be impermissible restraints on alienation because
they endure indefinitely. 58
2. The Reasonableness Test on Alienation
a. Class Size as Measure
In the modern day, the old bright-line rule has ceded place to one that
emphasizes reasonableness. 59 Often, the class size of potential purchas-
ers is the dominant factor in assessing whether a real property covenant is
52. Rose, supra note 11, at 198; see also Gale, 171 N.E.2d at 33 (noting that restraints
on alienation "may deter the improvement of the property").
53. Rose, supra note 11, at 198.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 198-99 (noting that courts in Louisiana and Missouri had held that racially
restrictive covenants offset any resale values of properties by "leaving a large enough pool
of buyers even after the exclusion of non-Caucasians," while courts in California and Mich-
igan determined that restraints barring ownership on racial grounds violated the rule
against alienation).
56. Gale, 171 N.E.2d at 33; see also Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal.
App. 152, 158 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919) ("We think that, on principle, any restraint on
alienation, either as to persons or time, is invalid."); see also NATELSON, supra note 4, at 49
(stating that contractual servitudes "may offend the rule against unreasonable restraints on
alienation").
57. Title Guarantee, 42 Cal. App. at 160.
58. See supra note 3. None of the regimes has a time limit.
59. See, e.g., Taormina Theosophical Cmty., Inc. v. Silver, 140 Cal. App. 3d 964, 973
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("[1t is now settled that only unreasonable restraints are invalid.");
Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
("The day has long since passed when the rule in California was that all restraints on alien-
ation were unlawful under the statute; it is now the settled law in this jurisdiction that only
unreasonable restraints on alienation are invalid."); NATELSON, supra note 4, at 594-608
(discussing the reasonableness of restraints in a cooperative setting, such as a condomin-
ium, when based on the shared interests of the owners).
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a reasonable restraint on alienation.60
i. Quasi-Religious Covenants: Taormina
In Taormina Theosophical Community, Inc. v. Silver, a California ap-
pellate court declined to sustain a real-property covenant in southern
California 61 that restricted purchasers in three ways: (1) the purchasers
had to be members of the Theosophical Society 62 for three years; (2) if
they had not been members for this period of time, then their purchase
was subject to approval by the community association's Board of Trust-
ees; and (3) purchasers had to be at least fifty years of age.63 The court
concluded that these restrictive criteria reduced the class size of potential
purchasers to infinitesimal numbers; the U.S. branch of the Theosophical
Society having only 6,000 members, the number of individuals having
been a member for three years decreasing the class size even further, and
the age restriction diminishing the eligible pool even more.64 Further, the
court weighed the small number of potential buyers against the potential
demand to own real property in southern California and the desirability
of the locale and concluded that demand by restricted purchasers simply
outstripped the tiny pool permitted by the covenants to purchase
property.65
ii. Yankees
Similar to the quasi-religious restraint in Taormina, a covenant preclud-
ing ownership by individuals of the Yankee "race" and those who had
lived north of the Mason-Dixon line for at least one year is also an imper-
missible and unreasonable restraint against alienation because the re-
maining class size of potential purchasers is too small. 66 Given that much
of the population in the United States resides in the North and the ex-
treme mobility of the American populace, the covenant arguably limits
the class size of prospective buyers substantially. On the other hand, the
pool of potential purchasers may not be as impacted if many northerners
60. See Taormina, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 973 ("The greater the restraint, the stronger the
justification must be to support it. Factors to be considered include the number of people
excluded and the effect of the exclusion on that particular group[, the "class size" of poten-
tial purchasers].").
61. Id. at 973 (describing the location of the community as "Southern California").
62. Theosophy is a philosophy that emphasizes "the study of comparative religions
and the latent powers of men." Id. at 974.
63. Id. at 968-69.
64. Id. at 973 n.7.
65. See id. at 973 ("In contrast to a vast potential market, the number of Theosophists
in the United States is exceptionally small.").
66. See Alfred L. Brophy & Shubha Ghosh, Whistling Dixie: The Invalidity and Un-
constitutionality of Covenants Against Yankees, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 58 (1999) (noting
that "Henry Ingram attracted substantial attention recently by recording restrictive cove-
nants on his [Beaufort County] South Carolina property, Delta Plantation, that purport to
prohibit people who have lived north of the Mason-Dixon line for more than one year
from ever purchasing the property"). The covenants also proscribe members of the Yan-
kee "race" from purchasing the property. Id. at 59. The restricted parcel of land is located
"just north of Savannah, Georgia." Id.
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do not desire to reside in Beaufort County, South Carolina, as opposed to
the southern California locale in Taormina.67 However, a court would
likely err on the side of caution and strike down the Yankee covenants,
given that they limit the pool of prospective purchasers to a substantial
degree.
iii. Race and Ethnicity
Racially and ethnically restrictive covenants have been the prototypical
private bases to exclude individuals from certain neighborhoods. These
covenants have included not only ownership bans on black Americans,
but also on individuals of Mexican, Asian (particularly persons of Chi-
nese and Japanese heritage), and Jewish descent.68
If class size of potential purchasers were used as the yardstick for the
reasonableness of a restraint, then many of the racially restrictive cove-
nants promulgated by white neighborhoods in response to the Great Mi-
gration were likely unreasonable. Given that many black urban areas
were overcrowded and white sellers could command premium prices for
restricted lots from black buyers because of black demand, 69 it would ap-
pear that a large pool of potential purchasers was being excluded from
owning property and that the restraints were unreasonable.
While certain courts agreed with this conclusion,70 others, such as
courts in Louisiana and Missouri, held that these covenants were only
partial restraints and left a "large enough pool of buyers. '71 This holding
seems to defy reason and simply upholds racial prejudice, given the large
number of blacks that have resided always in Louisiana.72 In addition,
67. See supra notes 65-66.
68. See supra note 10.
69. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
70. See White v. White, 150 S.E. 531, 539 (W. Va. 1929) (holding "a restriction on
alienation to an entire race of people, when appended to a fee-simple estate, is void as
wholly incompatible with complete ownership"); Porter v. Barrett, 206 N.W. 532, 539
(Mich. 1925) (holding a clause requiring that land "shall never be sold or rented to a
colored person" is void as a restraint upon the right to sell property); Los Angeles Inv. Co.
v. Gary, 186 P. 596, 597 (Cal. 1919) (holding a provision in a deed declaring that property
"shall not be sold, leased, or rented to any persons other than of the Caucasian race" void
as a restraint of alienation).
71. Rose, supra note 11, at 199; see also Koehler v. Rowland, 205 S.W. 217, 220 (Mo.
1918) (stating that "it is entirely within the right and power of the grantor to impose a
condition or restraint upon the power of alienation in certain cases to certain persons, or
for a certain time, or for certain purposes"); Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 67 So.
641, 643 (La. 1915) (stating that "while the public policy of the state opposes the putting of
property out of commerce, it at the same time favors the fullest liberty of contract, and the
widest latitude possible in the right to dispose of one's property as one lists" (citations
omitted)); Kemp v. Rubin, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680, 685 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) (finding that a restric-
tive covenant prohibiting the conveyance of property "to negroes" was not an unlawful
restraint upon alienation because "the defendant owner has been free at all times to sell
her property to all persons except to those of a particular race, for a limited period of
time").
72. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION 1920: COMPOSITION AND CHARACTERIS-
TICS OF THE POPULATION BY STATES (1922), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/
decennial/documents/41084484v3ch04.pdf (reporting that 43.1% of the Louisiana popula-
tion in 1910 and 38.9% in 1920 was composed of "negroes").
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blacks resided at the time in large numbers in Kansas City and St. Louis,
the major cities in Missouri. 73
Similar litigation concerning covenants barring ownership by non-black
racial and ethnic groups arose in areas where these populations histori-
cally predominated. For instance, restrictions banning Mexican-Ameri-
cans were at issue in Texas, 74 and those involving individuals of Chinese
and Japanese descent were litigated in California.
7 5
Just as Tip O'Neill, the late Speaker of the House, famously noted that
"all politics is local,"'76 perhaps the same maxim applies to restrictive cov-
enants and the reasonableness rule on alienation. As evidenced by many
of the racially restrictive covenant cases, 77 the Taormina case, 78 and the
Yankee covenant, 79 local conditions of demand by restricted and un-
restricted classes, as well as the sheer population numbers of these
groups, implicitly affect the calculus of whether certain "who" covenants
are reasonable restraints on alienation.
C. THE REASONABLENESS TEST
1. Background
In contrast to their public counterparts in zoning, which are con-
strained by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment,80 restrictive covenants are sub-
73. U.S. Census data indicate that the number of blacks in St. Louis and Kansas City
was significantly greater than in the rest of the state. See id. at 546, 562 (reporting that 9%
of the population of St. Louis and 9.5% of the population of Kansas City was composed of
"negroes" in 1920, as compared to 5.2% in the state as a whole).
74. See, e.g., Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272, 272-73 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Austin v. Richardson, 278 S.W. 513, 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1925), rev'd, 288 S.W. 180 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926) (upholding a covenant that
"said lot shall never be sold or in any manner transferred or conveyed to Mexicans or
negroes"); see also MANUEL G. GONZALES, MEXICANOS: A HISTORY OF MEXICANS IN THE
UNITED STATES 113 (1999) (describing 1900-1930 as "The Great Migration" and stating
that "[a]lthough statistics pertaining to immigration from the south are highly unreliable, it
appears that over one million Mexicans entered the country at this time, joining the half
million already in residence." Professor Gonzales also notes that "most [Mexican immi-
grants] settled down in the South-west." Id.
75. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. at 1, 21 (1948); Goetz v. Smith, 62 A.2d 602
(Md. 1948) (restrictive covenant prohibiting the sale lease, transfer, or occupation of the
property by "any negro, Chinaman, Japanese, or person of negro, Chinese or Japanese
descent"); Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181, 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892); see also U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 72, at 106 (reporting that 3.8% of the California population was of
Asian descent in 1900).
76. Tip O'NEILL & GARY HYMEL, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL: AND OTHER RULES OF
THE GAME, at xii (1994).
77. See supra notes 10, 70-75.
78. See supra notes 61-65.
79. See supra notes 66-67.
80. Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1519, 1526 (1982) (describing these constitutional restraints as "undemanding" because the
relevant "constitutional issue is whether the contested regulation is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest"); see also Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy:
Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13 (1989) ("Constitu-
tional rationality review imposes minimal constraints on public government, requiring only
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ject to judicial review under the general "rule of reasonableness." 81
There are two categories of restrictive covenants under this rule.82 The
first involves original covenants, or those found in a community's original
declaration of conditions, covenants, and restrictions.8 3 The second re-
fers to covenants that are added after conveyance or possession.8 4
The first category, concerning original restrictions, is cloaked with "a
strong presumption of validity," given that each owner presumably has
received notice of the covenants before purchase.85 Commentators have
construed this constructive notice as proving that owners have voluntarily
consented to the restrictions.8 6 Consequently, these restrictions, even if
facially unreasonable, 87 will be sustained unless they are arbitrarily ap-
plied, violate public policy, or run afoul of a "fundamental constitutional
right.'"88
In contrast, restrictions that have been promulgated subsequently by a
residential community association's board of directors and that were not
a credible instrumental fit between the regulation and a legitimate internal goal of the
public agency.").
81. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); see also Unit Owners Ass'n of Buildamerica-1 v. Gillman, 292 S.E.2d 378, 386 (Va.
1982) (affirming the reasonableness test); Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n,
556 S.W.2d 632, 635-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ) (applying the reason-
ableness standard to covenants restricting overnight parking); Ellickson, supra note 80, at
1526 (describing the reasonableness test as more vigorous than its constitutional counter-
part for public rules and stating that "[p]revailing common-law and statutory rules ask
courts to scrutinize the 'reasonableness' of private regulations-an apparent [invitation] to
Lochnerian activism").
82. Hidden Harbour, 393 So. 2d at 639.
83. Id. at 639-40; see also Unit Owners Ass'n, 292 S.E.2d at 386.
84. Unit Owners Ass'n, 292 S.E.2d at 386; Hidden Harbour, 393 So. 2d at 639-40.
85. Preston Tower Condo. Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1985, no writ) (stating that these restrictions are strongly presumed valid because
"each owner purchases the [condominium] unit knowing and accepting the restrictions im-
posed" because Florida mandates "full disclosure" of them); see also Hidden Harbour, 393
So. 2d at 639.
86. Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 829, 839; see
also Ellickson, supra note 80, at 1526-27 ("The initial members of a homeowners associa-
tion, by their voluntary acts of joining, unanimously consent to the provisions in the associ-
ation's original governing documents" resulting in a "true [Lockean] social contract."). In
contrast, Professor Ellickson distinguishes cities that enact public restrictions as having a
"more coercive (less consensual) form of residential organization." Id.
87. Hidden Harbour, 393 So. 2d at 640 ("Indeed, a use restriction in a declaration of
condominium may have a certain degree of unreasonableness to it, and yet withstand at-
tack in the courts. If it were otherwise, a unit owner could not rely on the restrictions
found in the declaration of condominium, since such restrictions would be in a potential
condition of continuous flux."); Fennell, supra note 86, at 839 ("Indeed, at least one court
has taken the position that restrictions in the declaration evincing a degree of unreasona-
bleness would be upheld.").
88. Hidden Harbour, 393 So. 2d at 639-40; see also Unit Owners Ass'n, 292 S.E.2d at
768 ("A condominium restriction or limitation, reasonably related to a legitimate purpose,
does not inherently violate a fundamental right and may be enforced if it serves a legiti-
mate purpose and is reasonably applied."); Preston Tower, 685 S.W.2d at 102 (noting that
this category of covenant "will not be invalidated without a showing that the restriction is
arbitrary in its application, against public policy, or abrogates some fundamental constitu-
tional right."); Fennell, supra note 86, at 838-39 (reiterating that the first class of covenants
are "presumptively valid unless violative of public policy or otherwise shown to be arbi-
trary and without any basis").
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in the original declaration of conditions, covenants, and restrictions are
subject to a more stringent reasonableness standard. 89 They must be "rea-
sonably related to the promotion of the health, happiness and peace of
mind" of owners.90 This more exacting rule is a by-product of the own-
ers' less than perfect consent to the restrictions. 9' These covenants may
be promulgated absent an owner's consent or, worse, over his
objections. 92
Flexibility, however, is a hallmark of both versions of the rule of rea-
sonableness, which lends it to wide-ranging descriptions by commenta-
tors, such as a "loosely defined standard" 93 that is "devoid of real
content, '94 and that substantively balances the "internal values" of a resi-
dential community with those of the broader society.95 Professor Alexan-
der hails the adaptability of the reasonableness standard as "open-ended
and conversation-inducing. '96
Conversely, Professor Ellickson critiques the flexibility lauded by Pro-
fessor Alexander as an invitation by some judges to ignore the fundamen-
tal social contract made by owners and the "enacting association's own
original purposes. ' 97 Professor Ellickson instead favors an interpretation
of the reasonableness rule, also favored by some judges, that looks back
to the association's originating documents to determine its "collective
purposes" and to assess whether its "actions have been consonant with
those purposes. '98 The only proviso in this view is that an association's
89. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
90. Hidden Harbour, 393 So. 2d at 640.
91. See infra notes 105-07.
92. Fennell, supra note 86, at 839.
93. Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REv. 647, 658
(1981).
94. Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism,
and Other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
203, 207 (1992).
95. Alexander, supra note 80, at 6 ("Courts have tended substantively to review these
rules, applying a standard of reasonableness that requires the rules of the group to conform
not only to the association's own internal values but to external values as well-Le., values
that, in the court's judgment, are widely shared throughout the rest of the polity.")
96. Id. at 59.
97. Ellickson, supra note 80, at 1530 ("This variant of reasonableness review ignores
the contractarian under-pinnings of the private association .... [T]he validity of the rule
should be judged according to the enacting association's own original purposes.").
98. Id. (citing Laguna Royale Owner's Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 672
(1981)). The court in Laguna held that "[i]n exercising its power to approve or disapprove
transfers or assignments [the] Association must act reasonably, exercising its power in a
fair and nondiscriminatory manner and withholding approval only for a reason or reasons
rationally related to the protection, preservation and proper operation of the property and
purposes of [the] Association as set forth in its governing instruments." Laguna Royale,
119 Cal. App. 3d at 680; see also Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556
S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ) (stating that "the Board of
Directors are authorized to make reasonable rules pertaining to the common area in the
Subdivision" and holding that a covenant restricting overnight parking is reasonable);
Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1375, 1406
(1994) ("On this theory, the covenants of an association constitute a volitional contract, the
terms of which are entitled to all the consideration that courts traditionally afford to con-
tracting parties. Ambiguity in the meaning of covenants, on this view, should be resolved
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action may not "violate [unspecified] fundamental external norms." 99
2. Consent
Consent is arguably one of the most powerful arguments in favor of
sustaining most restrictive covenants, including those restricting sex of-
fenders.'0 0 As the common law already acknowledges, consent is the pre-
dominant reason for the presumption of validity accorded original or
foundational covenants. 10 1 As Professor Ellickson argues, original cove-
nants are a "true social contract," on par with a private constitution, and
exemplified by "unanimous ratification" by virtue of notice provided to
potential purchasers.10 2 Because these restrictions evince a "more per-
fect form of consent,"'1 3 Professor Ellickson posits that they should be
upheld far more than their public counterparts.
10 4
In contrast, Professors Alexander, Frug, and Winokur have derived
several factors that they argue undercut the pro-consent arguments. 10 5
For instance, Professor Alexander points to the coercive nature of devel-
oper-initiated original covenants, given that the obligations to assent to
restrictions and to join a residential community association are often
"bundled"' 0 6 with the purchase of property. 0 7 Therefore, at least with
only by reference to the intent of the parties rather than to the reasonableness of their
agreement.").
99. Ellickson, supra note 80, at 1530.
100. See, e.g., infra notes 102-04.
101. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
102. Ellickson, supra note 80, at 1527; see also Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion,
and "Reasonableness" in Private Law: The Special Case of the Property Owners Associa-
tion, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 41, 54 (1990) (reducing consent to a mathematical equation, "Ac-
ceptance of deed + Notice = Consent."); Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in
Residential Private Governments, 77 B.U. L. REv. 273, 295 (1997) ("Unlike citizens, whose
options to exit the polity are limited, potential homebuyers are free not to purchase a
home in an association-governed building or subdivision if the association's rules are
unattractive.").
103. Note, Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 478 (1995)
("Proponents of unfettered experimentation in the creation of residential associations ar-
gue that members do not need the 'constitutional' protections against an association that
all citizens retain against traditional forms of government, for those who have joined a
residential association or participated in making its laws have exercised greater freedom,
or shown a more perfect form of consent, than have citizens of traditional polities.").
104. Ellickson, supra note 80, at 1528.
105. See infra notes 106-09, 111-13, and accompanying text.
106. Natelson, supra note 102, at 55 (explaining that Professor Alexander's view is that
"each servitude is 'bundled' with real estate and, in the modern covenanted subdivision,
with many other servitudes"); see also Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights:
The Puzzle of "Obsolete" Covenants, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 577 (1991) (commenting
that Professor Alexander starts from the premise that "[p]eople are 'coerced' by the
bundlings of distinctive units of choice: purchasers of burdened property are forced to
accept the burdens that they do not want in order to get the property that they do want.").
107. Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL
L. REv. 883, 902 (1988). Professor Alexander comments that:
This view of homeowners' association [adopted by Professor Ellickson] over-
looks the coercive nature of members in these institutions. Developers typi-
cally use servitudes to compel purchasers to join homeowners' associations.
The purchase of land in planned resident communities is burdened with the
obligation of membership; purchasers simply do not have the choice of opt-
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subsequently added covenants, consent is undercut because, arguably,
some owners may not have wanted to be members of an association or to
be bound by its subsequent actions. Also implicit in Professor Alexan-
der's conclusion is a greater respect for group autonomy over that of the
individual, as well as the supremacy of the collective over the singular.10 8
While in Professor Ellickson's world, it is easier to leave a community
if one does not agree with subsequently added covenants because individ-
uals have choices about the kinds of communities in which they may re-
side, Professor Alexander states that leaving is "at best an imperfect
strategy" because of the "immobility" and illiquidity of a home. 10 9 In
contrast, other commentators have responded that Professor Alexander's
view is simply too narrow-consumers across markets often are forced to
accept bundled choices and the fact that the "market is not perfectly cali-
brated to countless individual preferences" does not mean that con-
strained and coercive choices necessarily result. 110
Yet, the constraint of housing choices is especially extreme in many
housing markets, given that much of the nation's affordable housing is
dominated by servitudes imposed by developers and mandated member-
ships in residential community associations."' For instance, Professor
Winokur points out that servitude regimes have not only become the
norm, but also have become homogenized and uniform, reinforcing their
proliferation.1 1 2 As increasing numbers of common interest develop-
ments contain sex offender covenants, it stands to reason that these cove-
nants will become more standardized, ensuring their proliferation and
ing out of the association's decisions while remaining residents of the
development.
Id.; see also Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1589, 1590 (1982) ("[T]he original constitution of a homeowners association might
well be the work of a developer without the participation of a single person who becomes a
resident of the community.").
108. See Alexander, supra note 80, at 1-6 (theorizing that residential community as-
sociations provide an ideal vehicle for examining notions of autonomy between the individ-
ual, the group, and the broader polity).
109. Alexander, supra note 107, at 888.
110. Robinson, supra note 106, at 577.
111. Brower, supra note 94, at 248 (questioning the assumption "that there is sufficient
variety of affordable housing in the desired location to permit a voluntary consumer choice
among common interest developments and their regulations, or between a common inter-
est development and traditionally unrestricted housing" based on the "statistical evidence
of the explosion in the number of common interest developments, especially in the Sun-
belt"); Fennell, supra note 86, at 877-78 ("The explosive growth of private developments in
recent years means that many consumers are encountering this new form of ownership for
the first time. Often, homes in private developments are the only affordable choices for
young couples making their first home purchases."); James L. Winokur, The Mixed Bless-
ings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty,
and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 1, 5 (1989) (noting that housing markets are domi-
nated by "potentially perpetual, uniform servitude regimes").
112. Winokur, supra note 111, at 58-59 ("Furthermore, as more and more residential
properties are bound by servitude regimes, and standard forms proliferate, the option to
reject the model(s) of servitude regimes prevailing in a given area becomes less realistic for
substantial segments of the real estate market, particularly for those buyers who wish to
enjoy either suburban or condominium living. What might be objectionable in one set of
restrictions will increasingly be contained in restrictions of other area subdivisions.").
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further impact on affordable housing options for convicted sex offend-
ers. 113 In addition, further subverting Professor Ellickson's absolute in-
terpretation of consent in the context of original restrictive covenants,
given their contractarian underpinnings,' 14 is the legal tenet that freedom
of contract is not absolute. 1 5
3. Examples of Reasonableness: Age and Pet Restrictions
a. Age Restrictions
While courts largely ignored the reasonableness of racially restrictive
covenants," 6 the same cannot be said for another type of "who" cove-
nant: the restrictive covenant banning the residency of individuals under
the age of fifty. Accordingly, age covenants, along with pet restrictions,
are the paradigmatic "who" covenants upheld under the rule of reasona-
bleness.11 7 Indeed, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), federal legislation de-
signed to prohibit discrimination in housing based on largely immutable
and personal criteria such as race, ethnic origin, handicap or disability,1 18
carves out an explicit exception for senior-only accommodations."' 9
Otherwise stated, the FHA explicitly preferences private age restric-
tions, while disfavoring other private "who" restrictions, such as those
based on race, ethnicity, and disability, that have proved historically pop-
ular.120 One reason offered for this exception is a legislative recognition
that seniors have special housing needs and must be protected from "the
distractions and disturbances often caused by a large number of children
[or younger adults] living in the development."1 21
Perhaps taking the FHA's cue, many courts have upheld age covenants
as reasonable, under the Equal Protection Clause and at least one state
113. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
114. See Terrell R. Lee, In Search of the Middle-Ground: Protecting the Existing Rights
of Prior Purchasers in Common Interest Communities, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 759, 771-72
(2007) (discussing the "dual nature of the common interest community" and stating that
"[c]ommon interest communities must be viewed as neither pure conveyances of property
nor pure contractual agreements to submit to HOA governance, but a hybrid of both
characterizations").
115. Sterk, supra note 102, at 274 ("First, our legal regime does not sanction absolute
freedom of contract .... [W]hen particular contracts, or particular categories of contract,
do not advance the goals that underlie contract enforcement, doctrines often emerge to
counteract the norm. The unconscionability doctrine in contract law and nonwaivable war-
ranty of habitability in landlord-tenant law are prominent examples.")
116. See infra notes 128-31.
117. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text regarding age covenants. For pet
owner covenants, see infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
118. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006) (stating that, "it shall be unlawful...
[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for
the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin."); § 3604(f)(1)
(prohibiting discrimination "because of a handicap").
119. Id. § 3607 (allowing housing for "older persons" under certain exceptions).
120. See supra notes 118-19.
121. Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747, 753 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
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anti-discrimination statute. 122 Those courts that have held the other way
have incurred the wrath of dissenting judges that subscribe to Professor
Ellickson's view-that restrictions should be judged by the original inten-
tions and purpose of the community. 12 3 In sustaining many age restric-
tions as reasonable, courts also may be adhering tacitly to the pro-consent
arguments of the Ellickson camp,124 especially given the particular needs
of seniors.
b. Pet Restrictions
Restrictive covenants that prohibit pets also prohibit actual or potential
pet owners from residency in a CIC. While these covenants are not the
typical "who" restrictions that preclude residency or ownership based on
personal and largely immutable characteristics, the effect is largely to ex-
clude certain individuals based on personal preferences. The standard-
bearer for these restrictions is Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condomin-
ium Ass'n,125 in which the California Supreme Court upheld a condomin-
ium association's original covenant prohibiting dogs, cats, and birds under
the rule of reasonableness. 12 6
Does consent by would-be or current pet owners explain why courts
are likely to uphold pet restrictions, especially those that have been origi-
nally declared? 127 Or is it that, on the scale of personal characteristics
and preferences, a preference for pets ranks lower than providing peace
122. See, e.g., Hill v. Fontaine Condo. Ass'n, 334 S.E.2d 690, 690 (Ga. 1985) (sustaining
an amendment to original covenants "restricting permanent residence to persons 16 years
old or older" and citing favorably to other opinions upholding age restrictions); Ellickson,
supra note 80, at 1528 ("By contrast, homeowners-association regulations that limit the age
of dwelling occupants have tended to survive legal challenge."). The validity of age cove-
nants appears to be settled case law, given that the FHA specifically makes allowances for
senior-only accommodations. See supra note 119. But see Park Redlands Covenant Con-
trol Comm. v. Simon, 18i Cal. App. 3d 87, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (striking down cove-
nants precluding anyone under the age of forty-five years from residing in a subdivision as
"patently violative" of California's Unruh Act, which prohibits arbitrary discrimination,
and "therefore unenforceable").
123. See supra notes 97-99, 102-04, and accompanying text (Ellickson's viewpoint); see
also O'Connor v. Village Green Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427, 436 (Cal. 1983) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(commenting on the "disastrous" holding by the majority "for the many well-conceived,
constructively operated developments in this state limited to persons over a prescribed
age" who have "earned their right to retirement in other parts of the country" and whose
"comfort and peace of mind should not be deemed expendable on the altar of judicial
creativity").
124. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
125. 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
126. See id. at 1292 (sustaining an original covenant banning pets); see also Villa de Las
Palmas Homeowners Ass'n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1234 (Cal. 2004) (holding, "as [they]
did in Nahrstedt, that the recorded restriction prohibiting pets is not unreasonable as a
matter of law," and upholding a subsequently added pet restriction). But see CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1360.5 (West 2007) ("No governing documents shall prohibit the owner of a sepa-
rate interest within a common interest development from keeping at least one pet within
the common interest development, subject to reasonable rules and regulations of the
association.").
127. See, e.g., Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1292 (stating that the pet covenants were originally
declared).
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and tranquility to seniors and far lower than racially integrating
neighborhoods?
4. The Counter-Example: The Racially Restrictive Covenant
In theory, yesteryear's racially restrictive covenant, the archetypal
"who" covenant, provided an interesting context in which to apply the
general reasonableness test. Yet, few courts ever actually applied this test
to these covenants, 128 preferring instead to apply the rule against re-
straints on alienation, 129 public policy,' 30 or even federal due process. 13a
A strict application of Professor Ellickson's interpretation of the rule of
reasonableness would suggest that these covenants were reasonable, 32
given that they were often original covenants, restricted persons had no-
tice of them,133 and these individuals arguably had consented to them.
This conclusion is especially true because, prior to Shelley v. Kraemer, in
which the Supreme Court struck down racially restrictive covenants, 134
these covenants arguably did not violate any fundamental norm and were
not an affront to domestic public policy though, internationally, this norm
was found wanting.135 Indeed, much of public policy at the time may
128. See, e.g., Goetz v. Smith, 62 A.2d 602, 603-04 (Md. 1948) (avoiding the rule of
reasonableness, but holding that the racially restrictive covenants prohibiting "any negro,
Chinaman, Japanese, or person of negro, Chinese, or Japanese descent" was prohibited
under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause); Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W.2d 638, 642-
43, 645 (Mich. 1947), rev'd, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1998) (ignoring the reasonable-
ness rule and discussing public policy and restraints on alienation, but ultimately declining
to overturn racially restrictive covenants prohibiting all but "those of the Caucasian race");
Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 681, 683 (Mo. 1946), rev'd, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (failing
to apply the rule of reasonableness and agreeing that overcrowded housing conditions for
black Americans was an affront to public policy, but holding that it could not strike down
deed restrictions forbidding residents of the "Negro or Mongolian Race").
129. See supra notes 69-71and accompanying text.
130. See Sipes, 25 N.W.2d at 642-43; Kraemer, 198 S.W.2d at 683.
131. See Goetz, 62 A.2d at 603-04.
132. See supra notes 97-99. In fairness, Professor Ellickson states that original cove-
nants regulating the "racial characteristics of [residential community] association mem-
bers" are "offensive" and are exceptions to the laissez-faire interpretation of the rule that
he supports for these covenants. Ellickson, supra note 80, at 1527-28.
133. Ware, supra note 12, at 742 ("Despite the limitations imposed by the covenants,
black home buyers invariably found ways to circumvent them. The most prevalent device
was the use of a white 'strawman' to purchase property. Under this system, a white buyer
would purchase a home, then immediately resell the property to a black purchaser.") In-
deed, the Shelleys used a white strawman to purchase their home in the racially restricted
neighborhood at issue in Shelley v. Kraemer. Ware, supra note 12, at 751-52 (noting that
the Shelleys' realtor "negotiated a sale to a straw purchaser who later" resold it to the
couple).
134. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1948).
135. See supra note 88 (referring to exceptions for the presumptive validity of original
restrictive covenants under the rule of reasonableness); see also supra notes 11, 13 (regard-
ing the public policy and norms of the era with respect to racially integrated neighbor-
hoods). Mary Dudziak notes:
[in the years following World War II, racial discrimination in the United
States received increasing attention from other countries. Newspapers
throughout the world carried stories about discrimination against non-white
visiting foreign dignitaries, as well as against American blacks. At a time
when the U.S. hoped to reshape the postwar world in its own image, the
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have weighed against residential integration. 136
In contrast, modern fundamental norms and public policy have
progressed to disavow these beliefs. In today's context, therefore, besides
being unconstitutional under the state action doctrine of Shelley v. Krae-
mer,13 7 racially restrictive covenants would also be unreasonable because
they unequivocally violate public policy. 138
D. PUBLIC POLICY
While a strict application of the consent theory might support uphold-
ing all restrictive covenants under the rule of reasonableness unless they
violate some fundamental norm,139 expansive views of public policy have
proved to be fertile ground for striking down many of the "who" cove-
nants based on race and disability.140 On the other hand, courts have
used public policy to sustain restrictive covenants based on another per-
sonal characteristic: age.
14 1
1. Single Family Restrictions and Disabled Individuals
Ground zero for the use of public policy to invalidate privately legis-
lated restrictive covenants has been cases involving private prohibitions
of group homes for disabled individuals, most commonly the mentally
challenged 142 and those suffering from AIDS, 4 3 under a CIC covenant
international attention given to racial segregation was troublesome and em-
barrassing. The focus of American foreign policy at this point was to promote
democracy and to 'contain' communism. However, the international focus on
U.S. racial problems meant that the image of American democracy was tar-
nished. The apparent contradictions between American political ideology
and practice led to particular foreign policy difficulties with countries in Asia,
Africa and Latin America. U.S. government officials realized that their abil-
ity to sell democracy to the Third World was seriously hampered by continu-
ing racial injustice at home.
Mary Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62-63 (1988).
136. See supra notes 11, 13, and accompanying text.
137. 334 U.S. at 14, 20-21.
138. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. But see Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24,
34 (1948) (companion case to Shelley v. Kraemer) ("But even in the absence of the statute,
there are other considerations which would indicate that enforcement of [racially] restric-
tive covenants in these cases is judicial action contrary to the public policy of the United
States, and as such should be corrected by this Court in the exercise of its supervisory
powers over the courts of the District of Columbia." (emphasis added)).
139. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
142. Robert D. Brussack, Group Homes, Families, and Meaning in the Law of Subdivi-
sion Covenants, 16 GA. L. REV. 33, 48 (1981) (noting that "[t]he group home has proved an
attractive living arrangement not only for the mentally retarded but also for the mentally
ill, delinquent or emotionally troubled children, and the dependent elderly," and that these
"homes have encountered considerable neighborhood resistance" in the "form of litigation
based . . . , more recently, [on] a private subdivision covenant").
143. See, e.g., Hill v. Cmty. of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d 861, 865 (N.M. 1996) (stat-
ing that the "underlying facts of this case" involved the leasing of a group home for four
people living with AIDS in a common interest community that restricted use of lots to
"single family residence purposes" only); see also Baldwin v. Nature's Hideaway, Phase I-B
Homeowners Ass'n, 613 So. 2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Altenbernd, J., con-
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restricting occupation to only "single family use. ' 144 Similar to the his-
tory and use of racially restrictive covenants pre-Shelley and post-
Buchanan,145 these covenants became much more hotly contested after
public zoning of group homes for these individuals was struck down
under the tide of changing norms of public policy promoting the deinsti-
tutionalization and integration of the mentally challenged. 1 46 In addition,
Cleburne and the Equal Protection Clause forbade the unequal treatment
of this population based simply on "private preferences" or "fear of and
revulsion toward the mentally retarded" by public entities.' 47 In fact, the
FHA explicitly prohibits housing discrimination towards handicapped
individuals.
148
As in the case of racially restrictive and sex offender covenants,149
CICs have also been motivated to enact and enforce "single family use"
covenants that impact residential arrangements for disabled individuals
because they are concerned about dramatic changes to their communi-
ties' "underlying character," including "increased noise and traffic, de-
creased safety, and a devaluation of property. ' 150 However, numerous
curring specially) (noting, with reference to the application of a covenant prohibiting nui-
sances to a group home for six elderly adults in an adult foster care program, that
"[i]ndividual neighborhoods should not be allowed to decide that a small home, occupied
by elderly or disabled residents, is a locally undesirable land use, and override state law by
writing a deed restriction that would be unenforceable as a zoning ordinance").
144. See Gillette, supra note 98, at 1433 ("Consider, for instance, the issue of whether
prohibitions in covenants on the operation of businesses within the association or limita-
tions of occupancy to 'single-family' residences can be enforced to prohibit group
homes."); see also Thomas F. Guernsey, The Mentally Retarded and Private Restrictive
Covenants, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 421, 426 (1984) ("A court also will seek to determine
the meaning of such words as 'family' and 'single-family.'" (collecting cases involving pri-
vate restrictions prohibiting group homes of individuals with disabilities)).
145. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text; see also Guernsey, supra note 144, at
426.
146. Brussack, supra note 142, at 46-47 ("The group homes litigation should be seen
primarily in the larger context of the movement to deinstitutionalize the mentally re-
tarded."); see also Guernsey, supra note 144, at 421 ("Recent years have evidenced a grow-
ing deinstitutionalization of a wide variety of people, including the mentally retarded.").
147. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1139, 1130 (1986); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448
(1985) ("But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are prop-
erly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for
the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.
It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could not
order city action violative of the Equal Protection Clause.").
148. The FHA defines handicap as "a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of such person's major life activities." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602, 3604
(2006).
149. See supra notes 10, 13, and accompanying text (regarding racially restrictive cove-
nants); see also supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (regarding sex offender
restrictions).
150. Guernsey, supra note 144, at 424, 426. Professor Guernsey, however, points out
that empirical evidence suggests that "group homes for the mentally retarded do not affect
property values." Id. at 454 & n.197 (citing J. WOLPERT, GROUP HOMES FOR THE MEN-
TALLY RETARDED (1978); DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES LEGISLATIVE PROJECT OF THE
ABA COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, ZONING FOR COMMUNITY HOMES SERVING
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 2 n.10 (1978); Michael Dear, Impact of Mental
Health Facilities on Property Values, 13 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 150 (1977)).
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courts have held that these concerns are of little consequence when
weighed against state public policies favoring the deinstitutionalization
and integration of disabled populations, particularly the mentally
challenged. 151
2. Racial Restrictions
In addition to invalidating restrictions precluding the residency of the
mentally challenged and of individuals afflicted with AIDS, public policy
arguments provided fertile ground for challenging racially restrictive cov-
enants.1 52 In the context of these covenants, the challengers framed the
public policy argument as one involving access to decent and sanitary
housing by people of color.153 For instance, Justice Traynor of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stated in a concurrence to Fairchild v. Raines that
"the steady migration of southern negroes and the influx of negroes into
urban communities in response to the increasing demands of industry for
labor, together with race segregation . . . have made it impossible for
many negroes to find decent housing in large centers of population.
154
The concurrence went on to say definitively that segregation, partially in
the form of racially restrictive covenants, "has kept the Negro-occupied
sections of cities throughout the country fatally unwholesome places, a
menace to the health, morals and general decency of cities, and 'plague
spots for race exploitation, friction and riots."
155
151. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc., 400 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1991)
(concluding that the interpretation of a subdivision's covenant restricting the use of prop-
erty for only private residential purposes to preclude a group home for nine mentally chal-
lenged adults "is contrary to public policy as enunciated by both state and federal
legislation") (citing Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602-3608 (1990)
(prohibiting housing discrimination towards disabled persons); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-33-
510 (1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-7-830 (1989) (exempting group homes for mentally dis-
abled individuals from zoning ordinances); South Carolina's Bill of Rights for Handi-
capped Persons); Deep E. Tex. Reg'l Mental Health & Mental Retardation Servs. v.
Kinnear, 877 S.W.2d 550, 559-60 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994) (reversing an injunction
prohibiting the construction of a group home for six mentally challenged women in a sub-
division with a covenant limiting dwellings to single family residences because of a Texas
policy to support the deinstitutionalization of these individuals), rev'd, Kinnear v. Tex.
Comm'n of Human Rights, 14 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2000). But see Mains Farm Homeowners
Ass'n v. Worthington, 854 P.2d 1072, 1077 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (holding that the record
was insufficiently developed with respect to public policy in Washington favoring adult
group homes as an alternative to institutionalization of these individuals); Clem v. Chris-
tole, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 758, 785 (Ind. 1991) (upholding the application of a subdivision's
restrictive covenant limiting construction only to single-family dwellings to ban a group
home for developmentally challenged adults under Indiana's contract clause).
152. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
154. 151 P.2d 260, 268 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 269 (quoting CHARLES S. JOHNSON, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON NEGRO
HOUsING OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILDING AND HOME OWNERSHIP
45-46 (1932)); see also Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (Edgerton, J.,
dissenting) (decrying the limited supply of housing for black Americans as a result of ra-
cially restrictive covenants in the District of Columbia and the higher housing prices
charged this population as a result). But see id. at 873 (Miller, J., concurring) (accepting
the dissent's statements but ultimately upholding an injunction to prevent black home-




In contrast to racially restrictive covenants, public policy, like the rule
of reasonableness, 156 has been used to sustain age restrictions. For exam-
ple, courts have noted that public policy, as well as the Fair Housing
Act, 157 support the argument that seniors are entitled to a measure of
peace and quiet in their living arrangements. 158
E. PUBLIC POLICY AS FOUNDATIONAL IN "WHO" COVENANTS
The study of "who" covenants under the common law concludes that
the underlying factor used by judges to determine their validity is
whether they conform to public policy. 159 Since restrictive covenants
probably impact consumer choice in the housing markets, public policy in
the "who" covenant area centers around whether the effect of these cove-
nants is to unduly impact access to safe and decent housing by certain
populations. One thing is clear: unsubstantiated fear-based "private pref-
erences"' 60 that often form the underlying motive in the "who" covenants
cannot trump the open housing demands of public policy. 161 Moreover,
implicit in this judicial conclusion is the notion that the social costs of
open housing must be shared. 162
1. Touch and Concern
The examination of racial and sex offender covenants under the benefit
side of touch and concern illustrates that a population group's perception
of increased safety or property values, however biased or misinformed,
can marginally impact beneficiaries' property values or enjoyment. 163
However, does this conclusion suggest that perception alone can never
justify restrictive covenants? 164
The architectural covenant is instructive as a counter-example. Like its
more personal counterparts, it may reflect certain subjective biases based
on what is "ugly" or "attractive," qualities that arguably can impact bene-
ficiaries' enjoyment and property values. Yet, these biases are aesthetic
policy arguments used to support racially restrictive zoning were (1) promotion of "public
peace"; (2) maintenance of "racial purity"; and (3) mitigation of the destruction of prop-
erty owned by whites by people of color. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1917).
156. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
159. See supra Part I. These common law rules are touch and concern, the doctrine
prohibiting restraints on alienation, and the rule of reasonableness. See supra Parts I.A-C.
It is self-evident that the common law rule that restrictive covenants should conform to
public policy would focus on conformity to public policy. See supra Part I.D.
160. See Sunstein, supra note 147, at 1130.
161. See infra notes 162-76 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., supra notes 152-55 (public policy arguments regarding racially restrictive
covenants), 142-51 (public policy arguments concerning disability covenants).
163. See supra notes 38, 42, and accompanying text (racially restrictive covenants); infra
notes 181-82, 184, and accompanying text (sex offender covenants).
164. The development of Parts I.E.1. and I.E.2. was aided by conversations with
Thomas Kleven.
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rather than personal. What distinguishes architectural restraints from
their "who" analogues is that the latter, usually motivated by unsubstanti-
ated fear, ultimately touch upon public policy and the kind of society we
want to have.
On the other hand, are all restrictions based on personal and largely
immutable characteristics per se void under touch and concern because
they do not involve the use and enjoyment of land?165 In the "who" cov-
enant context, the answer to this question ultimately depends upon
whether a restriction violates or conforms to public policy.1 6 6 For in-
stance, age covenants are the obvious exception to a per se rule under
touch and concern, given that they are largely viewed as reasonable
under public policy. 167 In contrast, because they largely run afoul of open
housing norms in public policy, their counterparts in race and disability
violate touch and concern because they do not regard the use and enjoy-
ment of land. 168
2. Restraint Against Alienation and Rule of Reasonableness
The common law property rule prohibiting unreasonable restraints on
alienation essentially boils down to the same question posed by the rule
of reasonableness: whether a restriction is reasonable. 16 9 In turn, the rea-
sonableness of a restriction ultimately depends on whether it conforms to
public policy.170
For instance, there are a number of restrictions, such as single-family
use limitations or minimum lot requirements that might well be perceived
to be restraints on alienation from the buyer's perspective.' 7 1 Weakening
a claim of unreasonableness, however, is the fact that many buyers ulti-
mately factor these restrictions into the purchase price. 172 Moreover, this
reasoning holds up as much with subsequently adopted restrictions as
with those that are initially promulgated. 173 While buyers may be una-
ware of any future restrictions yet to be adopted, they are ultimately on
notice that a majority or supermajority of homeowners may adopt restric-
tions, of which they may disapprove or consider unreasonable restraints
on alienation. 174 Yet, buyers will bargain accordingly at the time of
purchase, again mitigating a claim of an unreasonable restraint on
165. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 59, 81.
170. See supra notes 88, 95, 99, and accompanying text.
171. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359-60 (1982).
172. Professor Epstein suggests that parties will take into account future transaction
costs when drafting agreements that contain personal covenants. See id. at 1360 ("If a
seller insists that a personal covenant bind the land even though it works to the disadvan-
tage of the immediate or even future purchasers, then the seller will have to accept a re-
duction in the purchase price to make good his sentiments.").





What this line of reasoning suggests, therefore, is that the relevant per-
spective with respect to reasonableness, at least in the "who" covenant
context, is that of potential buyers who are frozen out of the housing
market by these covenants. With few exceptions, freezing out potential
buyers or residents from the housing market based on personal and
largely immutable characteristics, such as race or ethnicity, disability, or
quasi-religious affiliation, and unsubstantiated fear violates open housing
public policy norms.' 76
II. SEX OFFENDER COVENANTS: THE LATEST IN
"WHO" COVENANTS
Sex offender covenants are the latest iteration of the "who" covenant,
given that they are predicated on an individual's status as a convicted sex
offender,177 a status that often endures perpetually. 178 The impetus for
these covenants is that all convicted sex offenders are destined to reof-
fend against children, irrespective of an individual's original crime or fu-
ture risk of dangerousness. 179 However, two questions remain: (1) How
do the common law property doctrines judge these latest "who" cove-
nants? and (2) Are these covenants more like race and disability "who"
covenants because they violate current public policy norms of open hous-
ing, or are they more like many age "who" covenants because they con-
form to these same norms? 180 In the face of the competing policy
concerns of open housing and public safety, this Article ultimately argues
that the common law should be used to terminate sex offender covenants
that are not narrowly tailored to restrict the residency of the most danger-
ous of this population, based on original crime and future risk of
dangerousness.'81
175. See Epstein, supra note 171, at 1360.
176. See, e.g., supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 3.
178. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 21, 23, and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., supra note 3 (restrictive covenants in the Panther Valley subdivision).
Given that a number of public residency restriction regimes on convicted sex offenders
have been sustained, see Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 623 nn.66, 67, it is fair to ask
whether private residency regimes on this same population might be held violative of pub-
lic policy under the common law property doctrines. The court in Panther Valley seemed to
suggest that the answers are mutually exclusive. See infra note 227. While the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on the validity of public sex offender residency regimes-thereby
providing a definitive answer, at least in theory, on their validity-a growing consensus is
emerging from a number of stakeholders, such as law enforcement, academics, and prose-
cutors, that, by shutting out convicted sex offenders from habitable housing, public sex
offender residency restriction regimes do more harm than good. See, e.g., supra notes 20,
21, and accompanying text. Similarly, at least a couple of courts have invalidated local
public residency schemes on convicted sex offenders on the basis that they were preempted
by state regulation of this population. See, e.g., New York v. Oberlander, No. 02-354, 2009
WL 415558, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2009) ("As the State has expressed its intention to
preempt the area, and, the ordinance conflicts with State law, Local Law No. 1 of 2007 is
invalid."); id. ("Sex offender residency restrictions are multiplying throughout New York
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A. TOUCH AND CONCERN
1. Benefit
a. Property Value
Arguably, sex offender covenants may increase the value of a benefici-
ary's land, thereby permitting the benefit of a restrictive covenant to run
with the land.1s 2 For instance, empirical evidence supports a small link
between sex offenders residing within one-tenth of a mile and devalua-
tions in home values.' 8 3 At a minimum, this evidence suggests that land
values outside of a particular radius are protected or even increased be-
cause the residence of a sex offender would devalue adjacent property
within the radius. On the other hand, given the rather limited effects of a
convicted sex offender's residence on property value, the same argument
could not be made for land outside of the one-tenth of a mile zone. At
that point, there is no increase in value at all as a result of the sex of-
fender covenant. Overall, therefore, the degree to which land value is
increased is rather limited, especially when balanced against the grave
legal and policy impacts of these restrictions. 18 4
b. Enjoyment
Sex offender covenants may increase beneficiaries' enjoyment of real
property by promoting a community's sense of tranquility and preventing
State, as local legislatures scramble to outmaneuver each other with highly restrictive ordi-
nances designed to banish registered offenders from their communities. 'Not in my backy-
ard' residency restrictions are spreading unchecked through county, town and village
ordinance books from Suffolk County to Niagara Falls. More than 80 such laws have re-
cently been enacted in New York .... Even without vigorous enforcement, the ordinances
interfere with parole and probation officers' efforts to find suitable housing for offenders"
) (citing Alfred O'Connor, State Preemption of Local Sex-Offender Residency Laws,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 24, 2008); G.H. v. Twp. of Galloway, 951 A.2d 221, 223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2008) ("We hold that the ordinances [applying to the residency of convicted sex of-
fenders] are preempted by state law and therefore invalid.").
182. See infra note 183.
183. Leigh L. Linden & Jonah E. Rockoff, There Goes the Neighborhood? Estimates of
the Impact of Crime Risk on Property Values From Megan's Laws 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12253, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w12253 (concluding that, although "homes directly adjacent to an offender decline in value
by 12 percent,... [they found] no evidence of any impact on homes located more than a
tenth of a mile away from offenders' locations"). On the other hand, a prior study which
examined "3,200 home transactions in Montgomery County, Ohio," found that, as a result
of publicly available information concerning the residences of convicted sex offenders:
On average, houses located within one-tenth of a mile of a sexual offender
sold for 17.4 percent less than similar houses located farther away, houses
between one-and two-tenths of a mile from an offender sold for 10.2 percent
less, and houses between two and three tenths of a mile from an offender
sold for 9.3 percent less.
Suzanna Hartzell-Baird, When Sex Doesn't Sell: Mitigating the Damaging Effect of Megan's
Law on Property Values, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 353, 369 (2006) (citing Wright State University,
Communications and Marketing, Sex Offenders Hurt Property Values, Wright State Uni-
versity Study Shows (Apr. 12, 2002), http://www.wright.edu/cgibin/news-item.cgi?310).
184. See infra notes 201-07, 224-31, 236-44, and accompanying text (concerning these




the harassment of convicted sex offenders, simply because there are few
to none to harass. 185 For instance, as Justice Souter noted in Smith v.
Doe, the most recent Supreme Court case to examine the first wave of sex
offender legislation-registration requirements and community notifica-
tion mandates-convicted sex offenders are often the target of harass-
ment by certain communities ill at ease with their residence and
proximity.186
Arguably, this first wave is not only the cause of sex offender harass-
ment, but also the enabler of private and public sex offender residency
schemes.187 In contrast to information about other criminal offenders,
there are minimal costs associated with accessing personal information on
sex offenders.188 Indeed, but for these initial statutory regimes, it would
be difficult and perhaps nearly impossible to determine if one's neighbor
is a convicted sex offender. Unlike the phenotypic cues of skin color and
facial construction, which largely serve to convey to society one's race
and ethnicity, 189 no physical societal cue exists to communicate one's sta-
tus as a convicted sex offender.
Does the beneficiary's enjoyment from a sex offender covenant stem
directly from a per se use of land or is it derived more indirectly, a reflec-
tion of the charged atmosphere surrounding the convicted sex offender
spurred by the first wave of sex offender legislation? Arguably, a sex
offender covenant "has no obvious connection with the land uses nor-
mally associated with 'touch and concern."190 For example, a neighbor's
promise to trim the hedges not only concerns a concrete use of land, but
also directly benefits a covenantee because the latter will have a better
view.
185. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 109 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring).
186. Id. (quoting Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1279 (2d Cir. 1997), which noted "nu-
merous instances in which sex offenders have suffered harm in the aftermath of notifica-
tion-ranging from public shunning, picketing, press vigils, ostracism, loss of employment,
and eviction, to threats of violence, physical attacks, and arson").
187. See infra note 188.
188. Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 1889-91 (stating that every state's Megan's Law per-
mits the publication of internet sex offender registries and that access is largely un-
restricted and free, and underscoring that there is no equivalent public registry for
offenders of other serious crimes, such as murder or "crimes more likely to target proxi-
mate strangers (such as burglary and automobile theft)," but if there were, one would
expect "significant numbers of homeowners associations prohibiting the sale of units to
murderers, burglars, and car thieves as well").
189. There are, of course, exceptions to this admittedly inaccurate phenotypic rule. This
argument was used by the NAACP to challenge racially restrictive covenants. NAACP
attorneys challenged some whites' automatic assumption, based strictly on what they saw,
that particular purchasers were black. Ware, supra note 12, at 747 (stating that one legal
strategy used by Charles Hamilton Houston, then NAACP's legal counsel and Dean of
Howard Law School, to defeat racially restrictive covenants was to "deny that the purchas-
ers were black," and to require that plaintiffs prove the black racial origins of the defend-
ants in order "to expose the irrational nature of the plaintiffs' assumptions about race
during cross-examination"). This strategy was employed in Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W.2d
638, 641 (Mich. 1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Sipes, "[t]he main factual issue [at trial]
was with respect to the racial identity of the defendants." Id.
190. See Rose, supra note 11, at 204 (emphasis added).
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In contrast, a sex offender covenant, much like its racially restrictive
predecessors, concerns not the use of land, but who lives on it. The per-
ceived enjoyment is not so much an outgrowth of the way land is used but
of who resides there, and it reflects society's subjective norms concerning
certain populations because of personal and largely immutable character-
istics. Criminal status as a sex offender, much as race or ethnicity, often
carries debilitating consequences, rightly or wrongly, that can last a life-
time.191 As Professor Rose notes, the fact that racially restrictive cove-
nants did not directly concern land uses perhaps explains why courts
largely skirted the touch and concern analysis. 192
Conversely, some may argue that beneficiaries directly benefit from a
sex offender covenant because they and their children are safer. While
this perception may appear intuitively correct, empirical evidence
strongly suggests otherwise. 193 The greatest danger posed by specific
convicted sex offenders who abuse children is from within, as upwards of
ninety percent of individuals who commit sexual crimes against children
are family members or acquaintances of the child. 194 Furthermore, con-
victed sex offenders have some of the lowest recidivism rates. 19 5 Finally,
the universe of sex offenses and those who are tagged with the label-
encompassing the eighteen-year-old teen who has consensual sex with his
underage girlfriend, the mother whose fifteen-year-old daughter is im-
pregnated by the child's live-in boyfriend, and the flasher1 96-is large and
ensnares a number of people who have neither committed offenses
against children nor who are at risk to recidivate, much less against
children.
The critical component of the enjoyment derived from a sex offender
covenant, however, is not that a beneficiary actually may be safer, but
that he perceives himself to be. The perception of enhanced safety may
be the "enjoyment" derived from the benefit side of the touch and con-
cern equation. The critical question in touch and concern analysis, how-
ever, is whether unsubstantiated perception satisfies the test, especially
when a covenant has little connection to an actual use of land.' 97 Argua-
bly, racially restrictive covenants may have been similarly grounded in
191. Smith, 538 U.S. at 117 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("However plain it may be that a
former sex offender currently poses no threat of recidivism, he will remain subject to long-
term monitoring and inescapable humiliation.").
192. Rose, supra note 11, at 203 (arguing that, with respect to racially restrictive cove-
nants, "American courts glided over the issues that lay behind 'touch and concern'").
193. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
196. Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 613 n.20; see also Sandberg, supra note 23 (noting
that lifetime sex offender registration requirements, for example, "don't distinguish dan-
gerous predators from otherwise harmless men and women who foolishly had sex with
underage lovers, served their sentences and don't need a lifetime of public scrutiny"). The
article relates the story of a convicted sex offender who appears on Texas's lifetime sex
offender registry because "he was convicted of sexually abusing a 16-year-old girl who was
half his age," but who is now his wife and the mother of his three children. Sandberg,
supra note 23.
197. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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whites' unfounded fears that they would be criminally victimized by cer-
tain populations, especially blacks. 198 Ultimately, Shelley was an implicit
repudiation of this concept-unsubstantiated fear by whites was not
enough to restrain black residency using private means. 199 These un-
founded perceptions of safety outweigh the marginal land value benefits
on the benefit side of the touch and concern equation.200
B. REASONABLE RESTRAINT AGAINST ALIENATION
1. Class Size as a Measure201
Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owner's Ass'n, a case in which a
New Jersey appellate court upheld a covenant that banned all Tier III
registrants from residing in a common interest community, 20 2 is particu-
larly instructive regarding class size as a measure in the sex offender cov-
enant context. 20 3 As the court aptly observed, the covenant's practical
effect was to restrict the plaintiff from selling her restricted home (assum-
ing potential buyers wished only to reside in it and not to lease it) to only
eighty out of the 8.4 million individuals residing in New Jersey.204 Conse-
quently, the court held that the covenant could not "seriously be consid-
ered an unlawful restriction upon [the challenger's] right to sell or lease
her home" 20 5 because local conditions dictated that there was still a sizea-
ble pool of potential purchasers, notwithstanding the restraint.20 6
198. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts:
Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479, 533 (1990) (discussing instances in
American jurisprudence when "prosecutors have tried to stimulate white jurors' fears that
violent racial minorities would prey upon their families and communities" by appealing "to
the general white stereotype of blacks as less controlled, and so more violent or more
prone to crime than whites").
199. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
200. On the burden side, a restrictive covenant runs with the land when there is some
relationship to the use and enjoyment of the covenantor's land. See NATELSON, supra
note 4, at 52. As demonstrated by the benefit analysis, sex offender covenants bear little
relationship to the use and enjoyment of land because they preclude who may live on land,
not what use may be made of it.
201. See supra note 60.
202. See Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1188-89 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
203. See Panther Valley Declaration, supra note 3 (citing the subdivision of Panther
Valley's sex offender covenant).
204. Panther Valley, 766 A.2d at 1192 (referencing the population of New Jersey from
the 2000 Census).
205. Id.; see also Herman, supra note 24, at 173 ("The size of the class in Panther Valley,
eighty people, seems so small in size as to not require the court to consider it a restraint on
alienation rather than a permissible small number.").
206. On the other hand, another commentator has argued that, if national population
numbers of sex offenders were taken into account, sex offender covenants, especially those
that ban all sex offenders, would be unreasonable restraints on alienation. Herman, supra
note 24, at 173. Panther Valley illustrates the tension between security and open-housing
public policy norms underlying sex offender covenants. The court was clearly concerned
with the public policy implications of these covenants if they were broadly adopted. See
infra note 227 and accompanying text. Yet the regime at issue was narrowly tailored to
restrain the residency of the most dangerous convicted sex offenders, limiting its policy
implications. See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
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Other factors, however, may weigh against concluding that many sex
offender covenants are reasonable restraints on alienation. For example,
many CICs, the neighborhoods likeliest to promulgate sex offender cove-
nants, are built in suburban and exurban areas.20 7 For approximately the
last decade, however, a structural adjustment has been occurring in favor
of central cities to the detriment of suburban and exurban areas, such that
the latter have been depreciating and the former appreciating in value.
20 8
The result has led to a marked increase in affordability in the outlying
areas where CICs are likeliest to be built.20 9 In addition, the combination
of long commutes, lack of public transportation options, and the harbin-
ger of $4.00-a-gallon gasoline has exacerbated declines in values in these
outlying areas.210
Consequently, some experts have predicted that today's suburbs and
exurbs will become tomorrow's ravaged inner cities, so common in the
twentieth century.211 This geographic role reversal is most vividly on dis-
play in Paris, France, where the city proper is largely inhabited by the
upper crust and ringed by brown and black belts of impoverished Arab
207. See supra note 5. Panther Valley is located approximately fifty-three miles from
New York City, New York. Iris Park is located approximately thirty-eight miles from At-
lanta, Georgia. Milwaukee Ridge is located approximately eight miles from downtown
Lubbock, Texas.
208. Christopher B. Leinberger, The Next Slum?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2008, at
71 ("A structural change [from the suburbs to the cities] is under way in the housing mar-
ket-a major shift in the way many Americans want to live and work."); see generally infra
notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
209. See Leinberger, supra note 208.
210. JOE CORTRIGHT, CEOs FOR CITIES, DRIVEN TO THE BRINK: How THE GAS PRICE
SPIKE POPPED THE HOUSING BUBBLE AND DEVALUED THE SUBURBS, 1, 7 (2008), available
at http://www.ceosforcities.org/files/Driven%20to%20the%20Brink%20FINAL.pdf (re-
marking that a "tectonic shift" has occurred in housing demand from outlying areas to the
inner cores as a result of increases in gasoline prices and stating that "[c]ities in Florida, the
Southwest and a few cities in the industrial Midwest have seen some of the most severe
declines" in housing values); Peter S. Goodman, Fuel Prices Shift Math for Life in Far
Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at A18 (noting, for example, the precipitous decline in
housing values in the Denver, Colorado, suburbs). Two out of three of these areas are
those where CICs are likeliest to be built. Telephone Interview by Joely Stewart with
Frank Ratham, supra note 14. An interesting question, though outside the scope of this
Article, is whether these communities may be more or less likely to adopt sex offender
covenants given their arguable vulnerability to residency by convicted sex offenders in the
housing markets.
211. Goodman, supra note 210 (quoting Leinberger, supra note 208). Leinberger, an
expert in urban land use, states that "[m]any low-density suburbs and McMansion subdivi-
sions, including some that are lovely and affluent today, may become what inner cities
became in the 1960s and '70s-slums characterized by poverty, crime and decay."
Leinberger, supra note 208. However, the article further calls this version of events "apoc-
alyptic," and also quotes other experts who describe this "gradual reordering" as a "rever-
sion to the center." Id. One commentator notes that this phenomenon is already
occurring in Los Angeles, calling it the "new archetype of metropolitan spatial segregation,
in which poverty [and its attendant 'problems and pathologies'] is no longer concentrated
in the central city but is suburbanizing, racing farther and farther out from the metropoli-




and African communities. 212
These outlying areas may prove more attractive to convicted sex of-
fenders, given their affordability and the presumption that this popula-
tion is largely one of modest means. 21 3 On the other hand, it is
conceivable that a time will come when this population is literally locked
out of the one place where it can afford to reside in the face of (1) a
growing sex offender covenant movement, (2) the rise in public residency
restrictions, and (3) the highly charged atmosphere surrounding sex of-
fenders. This prediction may be especially apt in jurisdictions where
there are already broad public residency restrictions barring convicted
sex offenders from living anywhere between 500 and 2,500 feet of a
school, park, or other place where children are likely to gather. Already
shut out of the city because of the higher density of publicly prohibited
zones and relegated to cornfields, underpasses, dry river beds, and indus-
trial areas, 2 14 convicted sex offenders may also be privately zoned out of
the lower density suburbs and exurbs. Prospectively, therefore, sex of-
fender covenants, especially those that ban all sex offenders regardless of
original offense or future dangerousness, may arguably be unreasonable
restraints on alienation after all.
2. Duration as a Measure
In addition to class size, the duration of a restriction has sometimes
been considered in assessing its reasonableness on alienation.2 15 Histori-
cally, the longer a restraint's effect, the more likely it was deemed a re-
straint on alienation.216 On the other hand, the common law doctrine of
212. See Craig S. Smith, Angry Immigrants Embroil France in Wider Riots, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2005, at Al (describing the suburbs around Paris as "the French equivalent of
America's inner cities").
213. There are no studies, either on a macro- or micro-level, which indicate the annual
income of the convicted sex offender population. However, anecdotally, Sergeant Brick of
the N.Y.P.D. Sex Crimes Division states that there is a large homeless population among
registered sex offenders and estimates the majority of sex offenders earn below $40,000 per
year. Telephone Interview by Joely Stewart with Sergeant Brick, N.Y.P.D. Sex Crimes
Division (Aug. 28, 2008). A study conducted by the Colorado Sex Offender Management
Board indicated that among the sex offenders who participated in the study, 22.2% had not
completed high school, 12.8% received a G.E.D., and 21.4% received a high school di-
ploma. CoLO. SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., REPORT ON SAFETY ISSUES RAISED By LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND LOCATION OF SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY 18 (2004),
available at http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/SexOffender/SOPdfs/FullSLAFinal.pdf. Al-
though the study did not include information regarding salary, it indicated that 6.7% of the
participants were working part-time and 15.1% were unemployed. Id.
214. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
215. Bruce, supra note 13, at 712-13 ("All courts would probably hold that a total re-
straint upon alienation which is unlimited in time ... is void .... " (emphasis added)); see
also Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 158-59 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1919) (finding that the reasoning in judicial precedent in which the doctrine prohibiting
restraints on alienation was at issue "leads logically and inevitably to the conclusion that
any restraint whatever on alienation, either as to persons or time, is void" (emphasis
added)).
216. See Bruce, supra note 13, at 712-13 ("The weight of authority no doubt is to the
effect that a total restraint on alienation, for an unlimited time, though to a limited class is
also void." (emphasis added)).
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changed conditions has been used to cure the infinite duration of a re-
straint as well as to upend restrictions that have outlived their purposeful-
ness. 217 For instance, restrictions prohibiting the commercial use of
property have been overturned when it became clear that the residential
character of a neighborhood or its environs had given way to a more com-
mercial character.2 18 Similarly, some courts used the doctrine to strike
down racially restrictive covenants prohibiting residency by blacks be-
cause neighboring black enclaves were bursting at the seams, spilling over
into protected areas.21 9
In the context of sex offender covenants, the doctrine of changed con-
ditions, at first glance, may not yield nearly the same effect. While these
personal covenants often endure indefinitely, 220 criminal status as a sex
offender is invisible to the naked eye, unlike race221 and commercial
character. 222
At second glance, however, the principle of changed conditions ap-
pears to have the capacity to act as a bulwark against inappropriate sex
offender covenants. For example, as the future portends increasing num-
bers of private sex offender covenants and their public counterparts, it is
plausible that courts may invoke the doctrine to stem the tide of sex of-
fender legislation. Recognizing that, in many jurisdictions, convicted sex
offenders, irrespective of offense and future dangerousness, will have
fewer and fewer housing options, possibly compromising their ability to
work and sustain a normal life, in addition to public safety,223 courts may
invoke a more creative, less concrete interpretation of the doctrine.
217. Epstein, supra note 171, at 1364 ("[U]nder a unified theory of servitudes, courts
must retain some residual power to set aside, even between the original parties, those en-
cumbrances that over time prove obsolete, costly, or wasteful." (citing Susan F. French,
Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1261, 1313, 1316-18 (1982); Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1258-59 (1982))); see also Robinson, supra note 106, at 546 (describing
the changed conditions doctrine as "simple and succinct: when conditions have so changed
since the making of the covenant that it is no longer possible to secure in substantial mea-
sure the benefits originally contemplated, the covenant is unenforceable").
218. Contra W. Land Co. v. Truskolaski, 495 P.2d. 624, 625 (Nev. 1972) (enforcing a
covenant that restricted a subdivision to single-family dwellings notwithstanding the defen-
dant's claim that "the subdivision had so radically changed" that the purpose of the cove-
nant was nullified, and holding that "the changes that have occurred since 1941 are not so
great as to make it inequitable or oppressive to restrict the property to single-family resi-
dential use").
219. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Raines, 151 P.2d 260, 266-67 (Cal. 1944) (denying injunctive
relief to halt the use and occupation of property by black individuals who were prohibited
from living on the parcel by racially restrictive covenants prohibiting residence by black
individuals because black and Mexican-American occupation of the surrounding area had
increased and, thus, residential conditions supporting the need for the covenants had
changed).
220. See supra note 58.
221. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
222. See Truskolaski, 495 P.2d at 626 (stating that the changed conditions doctrine in-
cludes an increase in population, an increase in traffic, and an increase in commercial de-
velopment where the city "condemned 1.04 acres of land on the edge of the subdivision...
[that] now is the major east-west artery through the southern portion of the city" across
from a restaurant and shopping center).
223. See supra notes 19-20.
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Under this interpretation, conditions will have changed to such an ex-
tent-albeit not as openly and visibly-that individual neighborhoods
alongside the state will have effectively rendered convicted sex offenders
homeless.
C. THE RULE OF REASONABLENESS
1. Sex Offender Covenants Generally
The reasonableness of original sex offender covenants ultimately may
depend on three factors: their (1) expansiveness, (2) duration, and (3)
consequent public policy implications. 224 For instance, although the sex
offender covenants at issue in Panther Valley were subsequently added to
the community's original declarations, 225 they are nonetheless instructive.
These covenants proscribed only the residency of the most dangerous sex
offenders, effectively foreclosing housing opportunities for only approxi-
mately eighty individuals in New Jersey.226 Therefore, the reach of the
covenants was limited and likely would not have significantly impacted
housing opportunities for many sex offenders, an important public policy
concern with which the Panther Valley court appeared to struggle.227
In addition, although the covenants endured for life, they were argua-
bly reasonable because they barred only the most dangerous sex offend-
ers, and the security and safety of neighbors in the community was
therefore more compromised. Further, at least one commentator has
paralleled the justifications for public residency restrictions and their pri-
vate counterparts, arguing that if blanket and lifetime public residency
restrictions are upheld because they are perceived to have a regulatory
intent,228 then private restrictions are similarly reasonable. 229
224. Herman, supra note 24, at 171, 176 (positing that, with respect to sex offender
covenants, "[t]he seeming reasonableness must still be considered in the light of the dura-
tion and size of the restricted class").
225. Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1189 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001).
226. Id. at 1192. While agreeing that the covenants could be measured for their reason-
ableness, the court in Panther Valley declined to accord these covenants a "very strong
presumption of validity" because they were not original restrictions. Id. at 1191 (citing
Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). The
court appeared to consider public policy concerns, the applicable test being whether the
covenants are "reasonably related to the promotion of the health, happiness and peace of
mind." See Hidden Harbour, 393 So. 2d at 640.
227. Panther Valley, 766 A.2d at 1193 ("Common interest communities fill a particular
need in the housing market but they also pose unique problems for those who remain
outside their gates, whether voluntarily or by economic necessity. The understandable de-
sire of individuals to protect themselves and their families from some of the ravages of
modern society and thus reside within such communities should not become a vehicle to
ensure that those problems remain the burden of those least able to afford a viable
solution.").
228. Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 625 n.82 (discussing that some courts have upheld
public sex offender residency restrictions by determining that the restrictions are civil and
regulatory in nature rather than punitive).
229. Herman, supra note 24, at 175 ("In enacting a total ban on sex offenders near
schools, the state was found to have legitimate reasons for its actions. A rough parallel can
be drawn to the overall issue of reasonableness with private communities. If the state can
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Taken in isolation, almost any sex offender covenant, especially one
which limits its bans only to the most dangerous of sex offenders, such as
pedophiles and rapists of adult women, would likely be reasonable.2 30
On the other hand, the public policy ramifications of sex offender cove-
nants weigh against their reasonableness, especially as they increase in
popularity and expand to ban all sex offenders for life, irrespective of
propensity to re-offend or the nature of the crime. 231
Where is this population to reside if they are banned from areas both
publicly and privately? Is society endangering itself by marginalizing
convicted sex offenders to this degree? 232 Further compromising the case
for the reasonableness of sex offender covenants writ large is empirical
evidence showing not only that convicted sex offenders are among the
least likely to recidivate among offender populations, 233 but also that the
greatest danger of child sexual abuse is posed by family members or ac-
quaintances of the child.2 34 On the other hand, the rule of reasonable-
ness would likely uphold narrowly-tailored sex offender covenants
banning the residency of the most dangerous sex offenders, such as those
at issue in Panther Valley-those who are most risk to re-offend for the
most dangerous sexual crimes.235
D. PUBLIC POLICY
Courts have used public policy to invalidate or sustain restrictive cove-
nants,236 a phenomenon paralleled in contract law. 237 Public policy is
particularly relevant in the law of restrictive covenants, given that they
are the nexus of real property and contract.238
justifiably regulate sex offenders, then it would seem reasonable that a private community
could do the same because it would have a similar interest in protecting its members.").
230. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 3 (detailing examples of original sex offender covenants fitting this
criteria); see also Sandberg, supra note 23 (noting that similar distinctions are not made in
public sex offender restrictions).
232. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text; see also Vick, supra note 17 (quoting
the California Sex Offender Management Board's December 2008 report with respect to
public residency restrictions and, by analogy, their private counterparts as saying, "Com-
mon sense leads to the conclusion that a community cannot be safer when sex offenders
are homeless").
233. See supra note 23.
234. See supra note 22.
235. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1189 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
236. See supra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
237. Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: "A Time for Keep-
ing; A Time for Throwing Away"?, 47 U. KAN. L. Rav. 61, 103 (1998) ("Contract law
principles commonly employ public policy concerns to find certain bargains unenforceable.
Whether a contract is against public policy is a question of law that the court determines
based on the facts and circumstances of each case.").
238. Id. ("Although real covenants are interests in land, they are created by contractual
promises about the use of land."); see also Ellickson, supra note 80, at 1526-27 (describing
the declaration of covenants in many homeowners associations as governed by "familiar
principles of contract law").
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In the only case to examine sex offender covenants, the Panther Valley
court wrestled with the notion that a surfeit of these covenants would run
afoul of open-housing public policy norms-in this context, to provide
safe and decent housing to convicted sex offenders.239 This issue will only
gain in importance as sex offender covenants of indefinite duration and
public residency regimes that indefinitely restrict housing access irrespec-
tive of a convicted sex offender's future dangerousness or original crime
increase in popularity.
While advocates of overbroad public and private sex offender restric-
tions may argue that these regimes are socially beneficial in the belief
that all convicted sex offenders pose a perpetual danger to children, 240 as
a practical matter, these blanket regimes may actually compromise public
safety. 241 The push to isolate almost all convicted sex offenders, regard-
less of recidivism risk or the original crime, may serve to incentivize re-
cidivistic behaviors in a population that is one of the least likely to re-
offend, thereby endangering public safety and defeating the original in-
tent of these private and public schemes. 242 Moreover, since "the vast
majority [of sex offenders] are neither imprisoned for life nor condemned
to death," our society implicitly acknowledges that they merit a place
(and space) in society. 243 Yet, many of these public and private regimes
unwittingly send an opposing message. Finally, the relentless and increas-
ingly harsh focus on convicted sex offenders diverts society's and public
policy's attention from the population that uncomfortably poses the
greatest risk in sheer numbers to children's bodily sanctity: family mem-
bers and friends. 244
E. MORE LIKE RACE OR MORE LIKE AGE?
In their public policy effects, are sex offender covenants more like race,
disability, and quasi-religious covenants, or more like those impacting age
and pet ownership? While courts have used public policy to strike down
race- and disability-based covenants, they have used it, with few excep-
tions, to uphold age and pet covenants.2 45
In the racial covenant cases, the driving public policy concern was ac-
cess to safe and decent housing for restricted populations, especially indi-
viduals of African descent. 246 In the disability covenant cases, access to a
certain kind of housing by the restricted group that would normalize and
239. See Panther Valley, 766 A.2d at 1193.
240. See Herman, supra note 24, at 167-68, 191.
241. See Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 607.
242. See supra notes 20, 23 (regarding incentives to re-offend and empirical compari-
sons to other offender populations, respectively).
243. See Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 642.
244. See supra note 22.
245. See supra notes 142-55 (using public policy to strike down race and disability cove-
nants), 156-58 (upholding age covenants), 125-26 (upholding pet covenants as reasonable),
170 (noting that the reasonableness of a restriction ultimately depends on whether it con-
forms to public policy).
246. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
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mainstream them was the dominant public policy factor. 247 On the other
hand, in the age restriction cases, access to housing by the restricting
group, as opposed to the restricted group of younger members of society,
was the overriding public policy concern of many courts.
248
In the sex offender context, courts seem, at first glance, to be less con-
cerned with housing access by the restricting group, or non-sex offenders,
given that this population is not limited in the housing market. Moreo-
ver, because many convicted sex offenders are not institutionalized but
are instead implicitly given the opportunity to integrate into society
through parole and probation, unlike past practices with respect to the
mentally challenged, access to mainstreamed housing is likely not as
grave a public policy concern. Rather, the largest public policy concern is
simply access to safe and decent housing, as was the case in many of the
race covenant cases.2 49 Arguably, the ghettoes of yesterday are the un-
derpasses of today.250
On the other hand, it is difficult to make the case that private residency
regimes on sex offenders, in tandem with their public counterparts, are
responsible for convicted sex offenders' limited housing opportunities.
Indeed, a credible question is whether, in the absence of these covenants,
many convicted sex offenders would even choose, let alone be able to
afford, to reside in these privately governed communities.
This Article argues that, while the answer to this question lies deci-
sively in the future, current trends forecast the continued devaluation of
many low-density suburban and exurban areas, exacerbated by high gaso-
line prices and commuting costs. 25 1 These areas are the most likely to be
regulated by private-covenant regimes, such as those banning sex
offenders.2 52
CICs also comprise the majority of new housing stock in the United
States, and they are increasingly the rule rather than the exception.
253
Unlike in previous decades, where these developments were enclaves of
the wealthy, today they encompass the most affordable housing option
for many. 254 In the face of increasingly popular public and private land-
use regimes that zone out convicted sex offenders, these communities
may provide the most affordable and livable housing for this population
as well.2 55
247. See supra note151 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
249. See Vick, supra note 17.
250. See Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at 22
(detailing the plight of five convicted sex offenders forced to live under a highway bridge
because they were unable to find housing as a consequence of public residency
restrictions).
251. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
252. See Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 610, 612-13.
253. See supra note 14.
254. See supra note 15.
255. The issue of sex offender covenants differs markedly from the more general issue
of zoning and deed restrictions on halfway houses for non-violent and violent ex-offenders.
See, e.g., Bannum, Inc. v. City of St. Charles, 2 F.3d 267, 268-71 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding
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Given this reality, however, should not these communities be permitted
to arm themselves with the restrictive covenant against the dangers posed
by convicted sex offenders, though fairness dictates that the social costs
of housing this population be borne collectively? 256 This is a fair ques-
tion, and it could have been similarly posed in previous years by private
residential communities pushed to house individuals of African, Mexican,
Chinese, and Japanese descent, as well as those with mental disabilities.
III. WHAT LIES BENEATH: PARALLELS IN
RACIAL SEGREGATION
Underlying sex offender covenants and their public analogues is a fear
that convicted sex offenders will prey on children, which, in turn, pro-
duces an accompanying desire to assuage this fear as much as possible. 257
Fear is an important basis for regulation. For example, underlying fears
for consumer safety have prompted important safety and consumer pro-
tections in the manufacture of food, drugs, toys, and automobiles.2 58
Unfounded fear, however, is an entirely different matter that leaves
little room for nuance in the wake of a highly charged and easily manipu-
lated emotional climate. The current environment surrounding convicted
sex offenders, who, on the whole, are among the least likely ex-offenders
to re-offend, 259 is one that largely makes little or no distinction between
the least and the most dangerous sex offenders, or between those who
have violently sexually abused children and those who have not.2 60 Yet
public and private legislators have not been moved to respond in quite
the same way to the dangers posed by other offenders guilty of more
proximate, and arguably more heinous, crimes such as murder, serial bat-
tery, and car-jacking.261
zoning on halfway houses for ex-offenders). But see Nicholson v. Conn. Half-Way House,
Inc., 218 A.2d 383, 384, 386 (Conn. 1966) (striking down restrictions on halfway houses for
violent offenders). First, restrictions on halfway houses involve the clustering of ex-offend-
ers generally, whereas sex offender covenants comprehend restrictions on individual sex
offenders (although, in theory, groups of sex offenders could live together). Restrictions
on ex-offenders in halfway houses, however, merit a far different debate from restrictions
on individuals, given that underlying the former may be a concern with any deleterious
effects of the concentration of ex-criminal offenders. More particularly, recidivism rates
for sex offenders are generally lower than those for other criminal offenders. See
Sandberg, supra note 23. Finally, this Article supports restrictions on the most dangerous
convicted sex offenders, mirroring the potential motivations of public and private zoning of
halfway houses for ex-felons. See supra note 27.
256. See Guernsey, supra note 144, at 424 (applying the question to group homes for
mentally disabled individuals and noting that "[p]roperty owners also argue that they
should not have to bear individually a cost that society should bear collectively").
257. See Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 607, 610-11.
258. See Stanton Phillip Beck, Comment, Enhanced Injury: A Direction for Washington,
61 WASH. L. REV. 571, 592 (1986) (discussing the idea that societal interests shape con-
sumer protection laws and stating that "[liability is imposed upon manufacturers in the
hope that it will promote the design of safer products and thereby afford consumers the
maximum protection from hazardous designs").
259. See Sandberg, supra note 23.
260. Id.
261. See Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 1887.
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Society has already seen this kind of unsubstantiated, sexually-predi-
cated fear that, when harnessed, has served to exclude and marginalize
vast swaths of the populace.2 62 Nowhere was this type of fear more on
display than in the days of legally and socially sanctioned racial segrega-
tion.263 In that era, private and public racial segregation practices were
human-zoning schemes designed to ensure that the infantilized white wo-
man, and to a lesser extent her male counterpart, were kept safe from this
country's original sex offenders, the black man, and to a lesser extent, the
black woman.264
Representative of segregation's image of the sexual predator was Em-
mett Till, the fourteen-year-old black boy from Chicago's South Side
who, on a summer visit to relatives in Mississippi, was charged with
whistling at an older white woman in public, a violation of the South's
social code at the time.265 Three days later, his deformed body was dis-
covered at the bottom of the Tallahatchie River with a seventy-five-
pound cotton gin fan tied around his neck.266
The safety of white people-analogous to children in today's sex of-
fender debate-from black individuals was meant to be assured in rela-
tively physically intimate and potentially sexually charged (or explosive?)
settings: neighborhoods, water fountains, restrooms, swimming pools,
trains, schools, and even the marital bedroom. 267 In all of these spaces,
the body was on display, and its fluids could easily be transferred or ab-
262. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND RE-
SUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 42-43 (1996).
263. Id.
264. The analogy is that white individuals, particularly women, are the equivalent of the
vulnerable children at risk of danger in today's modern sex offender debate, and black
persons, particularly men, are analogous to today's dangerous sexual predators. See White
v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 481, 482-84, 131 S.W.2d 968, 968-70 (1939) (per curiam) (overturn-
ing the conviction of a black man for assault with intent to rape a white woman for eviden-
tiary reasons, but emphasizing that "white women in this part of the United States do not
willingly submit to sexual intercourse with negroes, whatever may be their conduct in other
parts, and when a negro expresses a desire for sexual intercourse with a white woman, it
leads to the conclusion that he entertains a criminal intent, only awaiting an opportunity
for the intended assault"); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 262, at 42 (noting that one of the
two dominant myths concerning black sexuality was that black men and women were
"threatening creatures who have the potential for sexual power over whites: ... [t]here is
Jezebel (the seductive temptress), Sapphire (the evil, manipulative bitch) . . . . Bigger
Thomas (the mad and mean predatory craver of white women), [and] Jack Johnson (the
super performer-be it in athletics, entertainment, or sex" (citing CORNEL WEST, RACE
MATTERS 83 (1993)).
265. See The Law: Trial by Jury, TIME MAG., Oct. 3, 1955, at 18-19.
266. Id.
267. A LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE & THE AMERI-
CAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 42 (1978) ("As recently as 1967 more than
sixteen states prohibited and punished interracial marriages .... "); see also Donald Q.
Cochran, Ghosts of Alabama: The Prosecution of Bobby Frank Cherry for the Bombing of
the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 2 (2006) (describing segrega-
tion in Birmingham, Alabama, as very strict in that "[n]early all public facilities in Birming-
ham, including theaters, bus stations, parks, lunch counters, restrooms, and water
fountains, were segregated by race"). The idea for "racial space" stems from a talk given
by Professor Elise Boddie at the Black Female Faculty Summer Writing Workshop entitled
Racialized Space on June 27, 2008, at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
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sorbed. Another perceived danger was the potential for social interac-
tions that would break down racial barriers (oh, that person really is
nice!), which, in turn, could potentially foster the breaking down of more
physical walls, leading to the ultimate sexual transgression-mixed-race
babies. 268
In the private sphere, this zoning was enforced and maintained via the
pre-Shelley restrictive covenant, but also by cultural norms and social tra-
ditions requiring separate arenas in the more private parts of life-home,
worship, and social clubs. Underlying this private and public racial zon-
ing was what is triggering today's private and public sex offender zoning
in similar venues: an unsubstantiated fear that a certain population, be it
persons of African descent or almost any convicted sex offender no mat-
ter his original crime or future risk of dangerousness, will sexually violate
society's most vulnerable beings, whites in the days of Jim Crow and chil-
dren now. The results of these acts are intolerable sexual transgres-
sions-interracial sex and mixed-race children in the case of an era long
past and the sexual abuse of children today.
A. HISTORY'S ANSWERS
The history of racial segregation suggests, however, that blanket public
and private restrictions on an entire population are not wholly effec-
tive 269 and result in a cauldron of grievances that overflow into radical
and revolutionary change.270 On the other hand, some of the solutions
employed to deal with the sex offender problem posed by black men in
the era of segregation merit serious discussion in light of today's sex of-
fender debate.
For instance, is the vigilantism espoused by the Emmett Till approach
an appropriate answer? 271 While this reference may be extreme, it may
268. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 262, at 45 ("During the 1960s, the question whites
often used to end any discussion about integration was: 'Yes, but would you want your
daughter or sister to marry one?' The key as to why the mere posing of this question was
always such a powerful argument (to whites) against integration can be found buried in the
slave codes. One would not want one's (white) sister to marry a black because her hus-
band would be an inferior being who would subject her to his inferior urges, and would
produce inferior children."); Bruce, supra note 13, at 706 ("The natural law which forbids
[the intermarriage of blacks and whites] and their social amalgamation [even on local pub-
lic transportation], which leads to a corruption of races, is as clearly divine as that which
imparts to them different natures. The tendency of intimate social intermixture is to amal-
gamation contrary to the law of races.... From social amalgamation it is but a step to illicit
intercourse and but another to intermarriage." (citing W. Chester Ry. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa.
209 (Pa. 1867))).
269. For instance, blacks and whites did not stop loving one another. See Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1-3 (1967). Further, the baby boom of mixed-race babies born during
and immediately following the Civil Rights Movement is a testament to this ineffective-
ness. Interracial Baby Boom, THE FUTURIST, May 1, 1993, available at http://allbusi-
ness.com/professional-scientific/scientific-research/369759-1.html. Indeed, one of these
babies, Barack Obama, grew up to be President of the United States.
270. The reference here is to the Civil Rights Movement, which arguably inspired a
whole host of other movements for civil rights for other aggrieved populations-women,
Chicanos, the disabled, the LGBT community, etc.
271. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
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be accurate to say that the zeitgeist prizes retribution over safety in light
of the wave of public and private residency regimes that are cumulatively
marginalizing convicted sex offenders, irrespective of their original of-
fense or future dangerousness. 2 72 On the other hand, it is probably safe
to say that the Emmett Till approach would inspire moral and legal revul-
sion, even to a population as universally despised as convicted sex offend-
ers. Just as Emmett Till's slaying aroused the nation's disgust at racial
segregation and the unfounded fears behind it,27 3 the likely aversion of
this approach to convicted sex offenders suggests there are limits, re-
flected in public policy and social norms, to society's increasingly harsh
restraints against even this population.
Reflective of a more egalitarian approach, how about expanding public
and private sex offender schemes to include all ex-criminal offenders, or
at least those who are more likely to re-offend and who are guilty of more
proximate crimes? While these regimes would not solve the problems
created by the sex offender schemes, they would go a long way toward
equalizing their effects and highlighting the problems created when huge
segments of the population are denied housing. The schemes would also
create awareness of the social costs involved with shifting the housing
burden onto communities who have not enacted these zoning mecha-
nisms. On the other hand, the breadth of this zoning scheme would likely
make it utterly impractical.
In contrast, rational discourse suggests that there are more narrowly
tailored and effective solutions that may work either in tandem with or in
lieu of overbroad private sex offender residency regimes, given that the
state neither "imprison[s] for life nor condemn[s] to death" many sex of-
fenders, who have lower recidivism rates.274 One such solution is that
which was popular in the status quo ante-individualized residency re-
strictions, set by a court or a probation or parole officer for a convicted
sex offender, which take into account each sex offender's original crimes
and/or propensity to re-offend.275 A second approach involves publicly
zoning the most dangerous convicted sex offenders to accessible parts of
the city as part of a Sex Offender Containment Zone (SOCZ), where the
sex offenders may take advantage of comprehensive treatment, supervi-
272. See Vick, supra note 17 (noting that Proposition 83, California's public sex of-
fender residency regime, "passed by a wide margin that reflected the powerful public emo-
tion that experts and law enforcement officials say in this instance trumped sound policy").
273. See Steven Hartwell, Humor, Anger, Rules, and Rituals, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 327,
369 (2006) (describing how the murder of Emmett Till "created a national and then inter-
national media event" and also spurred public "outrage" that contributed to the "eventual
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964").
274. See Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 642.
275. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (West 2005) (setting forth comprehensive
guidelines that "identify factors relevant to risk of re-offense" and provides for "levels of
notification depending upon the degree of the risk of re-offense"); WASH. REV. CODE
AN. § 71.09.020 (West 2008) (basing an individual's classification as a sexually violent




sion, and accountability. 276 Still, if children's safety and security are the
aim, both of these proposed solutions are lacking, given that the family
members and acquaintances of victimized children commit over ninety
percent of incidents of sexual abuse of children.277 Large-scale public
health campaigns must educate children and their families, teachers, care-
takers, and care providers about these dangers and raise awareness of the
sexual abuse of this very vulnerable population and their likeliest
predators. 278
CONCLUSION
Sex offender covenants are the latest wave in sex offender legislation
ostensibly designed to secure the safety of families, and especially chil-
dren, from the dangers posed by convicted sex offenders. The problem is
that, like their public counterparts, many of these private regimes are
dangerously over inclusive and incentivize the same recidivistic behavior
they were designed to prevent. Another hitch is that they distract from
the largest population of perpetrators of child sexual abuse-family
members and friends. Further, they shunt the social costs of dealing with
convicted sex offenders to other communities, allowing some the luxury
of opting out.
The examination of "who" covenants based on race, age, disability, pet-
ownership status, and quasi-religious affiliation under common law prop-
erty rules suggests that the common law is ultimately concerned with
whether these highly personal covenants conform to public policy. As
illustrated by the effects of their racial progenitors in the era of racial
segregation, public policy may well recognize that a surfeit of overbroad
sex offender covenants, in tandem with the rise of their public counter-
parts and the highly charged atmosphere surrounding sex offenders, may
foreclose housing opportunities and imperil this population and the
broader public.
276. Tekle-Johnson, supra note 17, at 615, 642, 662-63 (proposing the SOCZ and con-
cluding that it would not violate the federal Ex Post Facto Clause, unlike many public
residency sex offender schemes).
277. Id. at 607.
278. Id. at 650.
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